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Probably  not, for the likelihood  of spontaneous  market forces
favoring  private  investment  is slim.  A more  promising  route  for
returning  to rapid growth in the industrial  countries  is to rely
primarily  on a government-led  expansion  to promote  investment
- something  possible  only with an unusual  degree of inter-
national  cooperation.
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The projections for economic growth in the  Expansionary government policies may be a
industiial countries during 1985-95 have been  more plausible route, although the pace is
revised steadily downward - to a pessimistic  crucial. Too rapid an advance could propel
2.5  k-ercent  a year. Can this trend be reversed?  inflation; a slower strategy could be too diffuse
to overcome the present downtum. Opting for
The crucial element in achieving high  bold efforts is probably more promising, al-
growth rates is a rising rate of investment, itself  though even here policymakers face skepticism
a reflection of confidence in the economy. The  that independent government policies can work
conditions that stimulate higher investment can  in today's interdependent global markets.
result from spontaneous market developments
or from sharp changes in economic policy.  One possible solution is to strive for inter-
national policymaking and to regain some
Chances that the former wiL occur, while  degree of exchange-rate stability. This kind of
slim, depend on putting in place policies that  intemational coordination could be the impulse
favor a surge in investment-led growth. These  for rapid growth, as it was after the Second
include reducing government deficits and  World War.
promoting technological innovatirn and en-
trepreneurial activities, particularly by small  This paper is a product of the Intemational
firms. Maintaining low inflation rates and strong  Economic Analysis Division, Intemational
demand are equally important. Despite the  Economics Department. Copies are available
existence of many of these conditions for some  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
time, growth has slowed even further.  Washington DC 20433. Please contact Joseph
Israel, room S12-007, extension  31285.
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As part  of its ongoing  work on prospects  for the developing
economies,  the  World  Bank  regularly  prepares  medium-term  forecasts  for  the
growth  of  the  industrial  countries.  Though  these  forecasts  are  limited  to
only  a few  key  variables  such  as output,  inflation  and interest  rates,
they  are  a crucial  input  into  the  Bank  s assessment  of the  outlook  for
various  developing  areas  and countries  between  now and the  end of the
century.  The  forecasts  are  usually  presented  in  the  form  of  variants  (e.g.
"high"  and "low" cases)  and use as inputs  both projections  prepared
outside  the  Bank  by  other  international  or  national  organizations  and  Bank
expertise.
it  may  be  interesting  to  note  that  there  have  been  some  step  downward
adjustments  in  these  medium-term  growth  forecasts  through  time.  Thus,  the
first  projection  published  for  the  decade  of  the  1980s  [World  Bank,  1979],
foresaw  an average  annual  GNP  growth  for  the  industrialized  countries  of
4.2 per cent ("base"  case).  In the subsequent  three  annual  reports,
however,  this  rate  (average  of  "high"  and  "low"'  cases)  was  put  at  only  3.2
per cent (the actual  rate is unlikely  to be above 2.5 per cent).
Similarly,  the  first  projection  for  the  years  1985-95  [World  Bank,  19833,
put  forward  an  annual  growth  rate  of  3.7  per  cent.  From  1984  onwardn,  this
was  revised  downwards  to  3.4  per  cent  (again,  average  of  the  two  variants
published).  Indeed,  work  internal  to  the  Bank  has,  in  recent  years,  tended
to  use  only  the  lower  (or  2.5  per  cent  per  annum)  of  these  two  variants.
To  some  extent,  this  increasing  medium-term  pessimism  may  be  mirroring  the
increasing pessimism  apparent in  short-term forecasts for  the
industrialized  countries.  In addition,  however,  it would  seem  to also-2-
reflect  a more  underlying  re-assessment  of the  growth  prospects  for  the
world  economy  on  the  part  of  the  Bank's  economists.  While  for  a  number  of
years  after  the  first  oil  shock  it  v:s  still  felt  that  an  eventual  return
to growth  rates  of the  order  of  those  recorded  by  the  OECD  area  in  the
1950O  and  1960s  was  feasible,  this  feeling  now  appears  to  be  receding.  Be
it  because  of  the  rnajor  financial  imbalances  that  beset  the  world  economy
at  present,  or  because  of  more  deep-seated  doubts  about  growth  prospects
in  general,  it  is  being  increasingly  thought  that  the  world  economy  may  be
unable,  over  the  coming  decade  or two,  to return  to growth  rates  much
above  those  that  have  been  witnessed  so  far  in  the  1980s.
The  present  paper  looks  at the  issue  of  whether  an  tration  in
economic  growth  is  possible  over  the  medium  term  (here  defined  us  the  time
span  between  the  late  1980s  and  the  end  of  the  century).  Its  aim  is  not  so
much  that  of  providing  a set  of  projections,  but  that  of  exploring  issues
and problem  areas  in the light  of both contemporary  debates  and the
evidence  that  can  be  gleaned  from  economic  history.
The  paper  focuses  on the  industrialized  economies.  Over  the  time
horizon  here considered,  it would  seem  highly  unlikely  that  any other
group  of countries  could  take  over  from  the  OECD  area  its  role  as the
"locomotive"  for  the  world  economy.  Table  1  illustrates  the  overwhelming
weight  of the  OECD  countries  in the  mid-1980s  in  both  world  output  and
world  trade,  a weight  that  has  fallen  only  little  over  the  previous  two
decades.  The table  also shows  that  even  on rather  extreme  assumptions
about  growth  between  now  and  the  year  2000  (a  further  sharp  deceleration
in the industrialized  countries  and a  marked,  and rather  unlikely,
acceleration  in the developing  ones),  these  weights  would  not change
dramatically.-3-
It  has  often  been  argued,  however,  that  the  real  growth  pole  of the
future  will  shift  away  from  the  North  Atlantic  area,  where  it  has  been
located  for the last two or three  centuries,  and move towards  the
increasingly  dynamic  Asian-Pacific  region.  While  it  is  no  doubt  true  that
a number  of  countries  in  that  part  of  the  world  have  displayed  impressive
growth  rates  for  a prolonged  period  of time,  and  that  the  importance  of
this  area  in  the  world  has  risen  sharply,  it  may  nonetheless  be  premature
to  concentrate  one's  hopes  for  a revival  in  economic  growth  in  the  world
at  large  on  the  successes  of  the  Asian-Pacific  region  alone.  More  than  75
per cent  of the  area's  output  is accounted  for  by only  two countries
(Japan  and  China).  Of these,  Japan  shares  some  of the  problems  of  other
OECD  economies  and  is  unlikely  to  be  able  to  grow  rapidly  independently  of
them,  while  China's  development  path,  even  if  buoyant,  is  likely  to  remain
essentially  autarchik.  As for  the  very  dynamic  smaller  countries  in the
area,  most  of these  have  so far  enjoyed  an  export-led  pattern  of  growth
which  has  clearly  limited  their  potential  for  stimulating  other  economies.
Here  too,  rapid  changus  in  the  nature  of  the  growth  process  seem  unlikely.
Inclusion  of the  Pacific  regions  of  North  America  further  enhances  the
area's  weight  in  world  GNP,  but  not  its  dynamism  - growth  over  the  last
twenty  years  turns  out  to  have  been  no  higher  than  that  of  the  developing
world  as  a  whole.
Even  if  concentration  on  the  growth  prospects  of  the  OECD  area  limits
the  geographical  scope  of  the  paper,  it  nonetheless  raises  a large  number
of  issues.  A first  problem  is  the  presence,  at  the  outset  of  the  period
under examination,  of significant  financial  imbalances  in the world
economy  (e.g.  the  budget  and  external  deficits  of  the  United  States  or  the
debt  problems  of the  developing  countries),  which  may  act  as  constraints-4-
on growth.  Looking  further  ahead,  and assuming,  optimistically  perhaps,
that such imbalances  will 1, solved  within  a reasonable  time span,  there
are contrasting  views  on lit*ger-run  prospects.  At one  end of the spectrum
are those  who  feel that,  be it because  of  maturity  and ageing,  or because
of resource  constrairts,  or for other reasons,  the future  can at best
deliver  only  very  slow  and possibly  decelerating  growth.  At the  other  end,
more optimistic  observers  have  argued  that,  if  only  the  "right"  conditions
are restored,  be these,  for instance,  unfettered  and deregulated  markets
or internationally  coordinated  policies,  an acceleration  in the growth
tempo  is  well  within  the  means  of the  industrialized  countries.
The  present  paper  cannot  fully  tackle  all  of these  issues  and  must  by
force  select  some  at the  expense  of  others.  Section  I  briefly  looks  at the
medium-term  constraints  on growth  which  arise from the present  financial
disequilibria,  and at possible  scenarios  which  may allow  at least  partial
resolution  of  these imbalances.  Assuming (heroically)  that some such
solution  will be forthcoming  over the next few years, the rest of the
paper then considers  whether  a resumption  of rapid growth  thereafter  is
feasible  and likely.  Section  II surveys  a number  of views  that have been
put  forward  which  suggest  that  the  post-1973  slowdown  was, for  some  reason
or other,  inevitable,  so that  even  a return  to a more balanced  world  will
be  insufficient  to  restore higher growth rates. On  the  assumption,
however,  that  such  views  are  unfounded,  or,  at least,  exaggerated,  Section
III examines the  conditions  that have made raoid medium-term  growth
possible  in the past, while Section  IV looks at the physical  and other
constraints  on potential  growth  that could  'resent themselves,  should  a
resumption  of higher  growth  become  a policy  priority.  Section  V, finally,
briefly  considers  the  future  and  some  implications  of the  analysis.-5-
I.  RESOLUTION  OF  IMBALANCES
It  is  well  known  that  the  world  economy  is  at  present  confronted  with
a  number of  large financial  'hsequilibria.  These are particularly
pronounced  in  the  United  Staces  tor  which  recent  estimates  [OECD,  1987a]
suggest  that  the  twin  current  account  and  Federal  budget  deficits  will,  in
1987,  be  both  equivalent  to  some  3 to  4 per  cent  of  GNP.  In  addition,  the
debt  situation  of the developing  countries  remains  precarious.  Despite
massive  adjustment  efforts,  debt-service  ratios  are likely  to increase
further  this  year  as  world  trade  and  many  primary  product  prices  remain
sluggish  [World  Bank,  1987].  Nor  can  much  encouragement  be  derived  om
short-term  prospects.  The OECD forecasts  only small  reductions  in the
external  imbalances  of the  industrialized  countries  for  1988,  while  some
projections  for  the  US  budget  [CBO,  19871  suggest  renewed  increases  in  the
Fedsral  deficic  in 1988 and 1989.  As for the developing  countries,
significant  reductions  in  debt  burdens,  let  alone  a resumption  of rapid
output  growth,  would  seem  beyond  reach,  at  least  for  the  time  being.
The  major  problem  with  these  worrying  imbalances  is  that  they  may  not
be sustainable  over  the  longer  run.  Just  as the  accumulation  of  debt  in
the  developing  world  led  eventually  to  a crisis,  it is  similarly  feared
that  the  building  up  of  both  domestic  and  external  debt  on  the  part  of  the
United  States  may, over the medium  term,  generate  a not dissimilar
outcome.  Against  this  it can be argued  that some  adjustment  has been
forthcoming.  The  third  world's  debt  problems  have  not  so far  ushiered  in
financial  breakdown,  as had been feared  by many,  because  both  policy
changes  and  market  reactions  forestalled  the  danger  (e.g.  in  the  form  of
widespread  debt  restructuring  and debt  conversions,  or via  much  higher-6-
provisions  for losses  in the OECD banking  system).  Similarly,  policy
changes  and  market  behaviour  have,  over  the  last  few  years,  set  in  motion
forces that are now reducing  the imbalances  in the industrialized
countries.  Thus,  the  40  per  cent  fall  in  the  effective  rate  of  the  dollar
against  other  OECD  currencies  from  its  early  1985  peak  is beginning  to
affect  trade  flows,  while  the  US  Federal  budget  deficit  has  been  sharply
cut  in the  last  year  both  in  absolute  terms  and,  even  more,  relative  to
CUP.
Though  these  changes  are  welcome,  their  progress  is  both  slow  and
uncertain.  As was seen above,  the debt situation  of the developing
countries  may have been stabilized,  but remains  very fragile,  while
progress  on reducing  the  US  Federal  deficit  is  likely  to  be  interrupted,
at least in the short  run, if only because  of impending  electoral
deadlines  and  the  timing  vagaries  of  tax  reform.  OFCD  external  imbalances
are  expected  to  diminish  in  thg  cnurse  of  1988,  aed  probably  beyond,  but,
on present  trends  and  policies,  the  US current  deficit  will  remain  very
large  for  a number  of  years,  thus  implying  continuing  and  rapid  additions
to  the  country's  external  indebtedness.
The  slowness  of  these  -5  cments,  in  turn,  constrains  the  growth  of
the  world  economy.  In  the  Un  Wed  States,  the  need  for  a reduction  in  the
Federal  budget  deficit  implies  a  need  for  a  relatively  restrictive  fiscal
policy  over  the  medium  term.  At the same  time,  the  sluggishness  of the
current  Lalance's  response  to  exchange  rate  changes  creates  the  danger  of
further  falls  in  the  value  of the  dollar.  Be it  to  prevent  these,  or to
offset  the inflationary  effects  of past  depreciations  on the domestic
ecovomy,  monetary  policy  may also find itself  constrained  into a
restrictive  posture.  Though  growth  would,  no  doubt,  be stimulated  by the-7-
external  sector,  it  is  unlikely  chat  this  could  fully  offset  the  negative
influences  coming  from  tighter  policies.
In  the  rest  of the  OQCD  area,  on the  other  hand,  the  constraint  on
growth  would come from the effects  of currency  appreciation  (and US
sluggishness)  on  net exports  and  on investment  in  the  tredeable  sector.
While more  expansionary  policies could, in  theory, offset such
deflationary  impulses,  the  likelihood  of them  being  taken  is small  - on
the  one  hand,  many  European  countries,  as  well  as  Japan,  feel  that  public
finance  consolidation  remains  a  very important  objective  of economic
policy  (even  in  those  cases  in  which  budget  deficits  have  been  reduced  to
negligible  proportions);  on the other,  many  of the same  countries  also
share  a deeply  ingrained  mercantilist  outlook  that strongly  militates
against  them  accepting  sharp  deteriorations  in their  current  balances.
Resistance  to such  inevitable  deteriorations  may well  take  the  form  of
more  restrictive  policy  stances.  Given  subdued  domestic  growth  in  the  OECD
area,  and  hence  only  slow  growth  in  world  trade,  continuing  weakness  in
real primary product prices and, possibly,  further increases  in
protectionism,  the developing  countries  are likely  to remain  heavily
constrained  by their  balance  of  payments  situations,  thus  further  adding
to  the  sluggishness  of  the  world  economy.
Indeed,  even  this  scenario  of  a very  slowly  growing  and  adjusting
world  may  not materialize.  The continuation  over  a number  of years  of
large,  if diminishing,  imbalances  may  not be tenable  and something  may
"give".  The  often  feared  scenario  is  one  in  which  markets  precipitate  a
collapse  of  the  dollar,  inflation  accelerates  in  the  United  States  leading
to  a sharp  response  from  the  monetary  authorities  and  a  recession  follows
[Harris,  1985].  A  much  lower  dollar  and  much  reduced  US  demand  have  strong-8-
negative  effects  on  the  rest  of  the  OECD  area,  while  lower  US  demand  and,
especially,  higher  US interest  rates  have similar,  or possibly  more
dramatic,  effects  on  the  developing  world.
What the foregoing  suggests,  is that,  barring  a  timely  and
coordinated,  but  highly  unlikely,  policy  response  by  the  major  countries,
growth  in  the  world  economy  will,  at best,  be  only  modest  over  the  next
few  years.  Given  the  range  of uncertainties  (including  political  ones,
especially  for  the  United  States),  putting  forward  precise  forec:.  - may
not be a very  rewarding  exercise.  But some  rough  idea  of the  range  of
possibilities  can  be gleaned  from  a number  of scenarios  for  the  coming
five  years  put forward  by the  World  Bank.  Starting  from  a "reference"
scenario,  which  basically  extrapolates  the  policy  intentions  and  exhange
rate  levels  of  early  1987  (and  is  thought  to  be  untenable),  the  World  Bank
goes  on to illustrate  the  effects  of a number  of different  policy  and
exchange  rate  assumptions  on  crucial  variables  between  1987  and  1992.
Three  of  these  scenarios  are  presented  in  Table  2 - the  "reference"
scenario,  in  which  exchange  rates  are  frozen  at their  end-1986  level  and
the  US  Federal  budget  deficit  is  forecast  to  decline  to  $  100  bn.  by  1992,
and two  variants  which  explore  the  effects  of  a more  restrictive  fiscal
policy  in  the  United  States  and  a 1-  per  cent  additional  depreciation  of
the  dollar  (the  latter  already  achieved  by  end-1987).  It  will  be  seen  that
these  more realistic  variants  p,  erate outcomes  that can hardly  be
considered  very  favourable.  Growth  in  the  OECD  area,  which  had  slowed  down
from  a 2.7  per  cent  annual  rate  in  the  years  1973-79  to one  of 2.3  per
cent  per  annum  in  the  years  1979-87,  slows  down  even  further  to  roughly  2
per  cent  on  average.  It  is  true  that  the  US  General  Government  records  a
budget  surpluu  by  the  end  of the  period  (implying  rough  bal&nce  for .ie-9-
Federal  budget),  bat the current  account  remains  in substantial,  if
declining,  deficit.
The  same  might  not  be  true  if  the  alternative  assumption  was  made  of
a US recession.  Growth  over  the  next  few  years  would,  clearly,  be  even
more  subOued,  but  it  is  not  inconceivable  that  at  the  end  of  the  recession
the present  disequilibria  may have been, if not solved,  at least
substantially  reduced.  Recession,  in  particular,  should  strengthen  the  US
current  account  by  more  than  suggested  in  the  scenarios  presented  in  Table
2,  even  if  it  led  to  a  smaller  improvement  in  the  fiscal  position.
Both  outcomes  contain  clear  dangers.  In  the  recession  case,  the  main
risk  is that  the  situation  of the  developing  countries  has so worsened
that  a new-  debt  crisis  erupts.  Hopefully,  policy  makers  and  markets  have
learnt  the  lessons  of the  previous  crisis  and  will  be  able  to  avoid  the
occurrence  of  a  new  one.  In  the  more  gradual  adjustment  scenarios  modelled
by  the  World  Bank,  resolution  of  the  US  external  imbalance  turns  out  to  be
such  a protracted  matter  that  the  world  economy  could  find  itself  semi-
permanently  locked  into  a low  growth  trap.  Arguably,  however,  this  may  not
be  inevitable.  In  so  far  as  fiscal  policy  restriction  in  the  United  States
will have eliminated  the Federal  deficit  by the early  1990s  (as the
scene,-ios  assume),  and further  dollar  depreciation  will  have  put  the  US
current  account  on  a firmly  improving  trend  (by  1992,  in  both  scenarios,
the  deficit  will  represent  only 1 1/2  per  cent  of GNP as against  the
nearly  3 1/2  per  cent  expected  for  1987),  it  may  be  possible  to  envisage
some  decrease  in the degree  of market  uncertainty  and some  return  of
confidence,  from  which  a  move  to  higher  growth  rates  may  then  be  possible.
And  a similar  return  of confidence  may  follow  in  the  wake  of  the  sharper
adjustment  path  inflicted  by  recession.-10-
The  precise  date  at  which  such  a  turnaround  in  expectations  occurs  is
not  absolutely  crucial.  What  is  being  assumed  is that,  some  time  in  the
early  1990s,  thanks  to fiscal  stringency  in the United  States,  some
further  dollar  depreciation,  and,  possibly,  recession,  there  would  be a
strengthening  perception  that  the  worst  was  now  over.  In  particular,  it
would  be felt  that  the  US budget  situation  was  either  under  control,  or
seen  to  be improving,  that  external  imbalances  were  much  reduced,  and/or
being  slowly  unwound  (implying  the  maintenance  of medium-term  exchange
rate  stability  around  th  revailing  rates),  and  that  both  inflation  and
interest  rate levels  were relatively  low. It is readily  admitted  that
there  may  be  a good  dose  of  optimism  in  such  a projection.  Persistence  of
large  external  imbalances  and  mounting  debt  levels  in  some  countries  may
pestpetuate  unfavourable  expectations  and restrictive  policy  stances.  A
t. sharp  rccession,  on the other  hand,  rather  than  solving  some  problems
ould  worsen  them  and/or  generate  new  and  even  more  intractable  ones.  The
assumption  here  made  that neither of  these pessimistic  outcomes
materializes,  is  adopted  solely  for  expository  purposes.  The  question  as
to whether  a  resumption  of more rarid growth  in the industrialized
countries  (and  in the  world  at large)  is  possible  can  only  be  posed  if
some  return  to a more balanced  international  economy  has first  been
achieved.-1 1-
II.  IS  STAGNATION  INEVITABLE?
The  Introduction  to this  paper  has  argued  that  the  resolution  of
present  financial  disequilibria  is  a necessary  condition  for  a resumption
of faster  growth.  It is,  however,  far  from  being  a sufficient  condition.
Even  a return  to a more  balanced  world  may  not  be  enough  to  generate  an
acceleration  in  growth  rates.  This  would,  in  particular,  be the  case  if
there were some longer-run  constraints  inhibiting  expansion  in the
industrialized  countries.  Stagnationist  theories,  advancing  reasons  for  an
eventual  permanent  or  near-permanent  economic  slowdown,  have  long  been
popular.  While  a full  review  is  clearly  beyond  the  scope  of  the  present
exercise,  some  of  the  better  known  approaches  will  briefly  be  mentioned  in
what  follows.  To  order  the  discussion,  a  broad,  three-group,  division  will
be  used:
i)  Theories  that  see  the economy  inevitably  subject  to very  long
swings,  with the  present  slowdown  as part  of a downward  phase
which  it  will  take  time  to  unwind;
ii) Views  that  see  the inevitable  deceleration  stemming  from  purely
physical  constraints;
iii)  Approaches  that  stress  social  changes,  and,  in particular,  the
retarding  effects  of  maturity  and  greater  wealth.
Kondratieff  Cycles
A  view  of  an  inevitable,  but  not  permanent,  deceleration  in  growth  is
provided  by analyses  that  stress  the existence  of long-run  cycles  (of
roughly  50  years  in  duration),  which  are  usually  associated  with  the  name
of  Kondratieff.  The  past  decade  or  so  has  seen  a revival  of  literature  on
such  cycles  (e.g.  Mandel,  1980;  Freeman,  1983;  Van  Dujin,  19831,  with  many-12-
authors  stressing  the  appearance  of  a  new  peak  in  the  early  1970s  (similar
to those  already  experienced  in,  for  instance,  the  1810s,  the  i860s  and
the  1920s).  If  this  was  accepted,  the  present  sluggishness  would  represent
the  inevitable  downward  phase  of the  cycle  and little  could  be  done  to
either  shorten  or invert  it.  On the  basis  of past  historical  patterns,
recovery  would  have  to  wait  for,  say,  the  late  1990s  or  the  early  years  of
the  next  century.
The problem  with this fatalistic  approach  is that  neither  the
empirical  regularities  of Kondratieff  cycles  nor the forces  generating
them  have been clearly  established.  The dates  that  have  usually  been
chosen  to  determine  past  turning  points  are  open  to  disagreement  and  rely
more  on  price  than  on  output  statistics.  As  for  causes,  these  have  spanned
from  the  influence  of  sun  spots  on  agricultural  production  to  the  effects
of  military  spending  and  wars  on investment  and  output.  One  of  the  more
plausible  explanations  uses  the  concept  of technological  waves,  but  most
research  in this  area  has  concluded  that  technological  progress  is very
seldom  a discontinuous  process  and even when major  breaktroughs  have
occurred,  these have been  insufficient  to  initiate  general  booms
[Chesnais,  19821.
The  whole  theory  of  Kondratieff  cycles,  in  other  words,  is  one  of
(dubious)  regularities  of a mechanistic,  and largely  unexplained,  kind.
The OECD  countries  have  clearly  entered  a period  of slowdown,  but to
define  this  as the  downward  phase  of  an inevitable  long-run  cycle  would
seem  to be, at least,  premature.  A more  fruitful  approach  ir that  of
recognizing  the existence  of  changes  in the growth tempo of  the
industrialized  countries,  but  of  attributing  these to  specific
disturbances  rather  than to regular  rhytmic  movements:  "Major  system-13-
shocks  change  the momentum  of capitalist  development  at certain  points.
Sometimes  they  are  more or less  accidental  in  origin;  sometimes  they  occur
because some inherently  unstable  situation  can no longer  be lived  with"
[Maddison,  1982,  p.831.
Physical  Constraints
More  radical  than  a theory  of long  cycles,  in  which  the  possibility  of
eventual recovery is implicit,  are  those stagnationist  theories  which
stress  the finiteness  of physical  resources.  These have a long history,
which  goes back to Ricardo  and  Malthus  and  their  fears  that  a fixed  supply
of land,  or too  rapid  a  growth  of population,  would  put  an end  to economic
growth. In  a  somewhat different vein,  even Keynes feared that an
oversupply  of savings  would  drive  the  marginal  productivity  of capital  co
zero and hence exhaust growth opportunities.  The  continued  and rapid
growth  of technology  has put to rest most of these  gloomy  forecasts,  but
their place was, temporarily  at least,  taken by the forebodings  of the
Club of Rome on the  inevitable  exhaustion  of certain  raw  materials.  There
is an abundant  literature  on this issue,  whose  main conclusion  would  seem
to be  that, as  long as  prices are  allowed to vary in  response to
threatened  scarcities,  such  scarcities  are  unlikely  to  materialize.  Rising
relative prices  for  non-renewable  resources are  bound  to  encourage
substitution  in both consumption  and production (as suggested  by  the
course  of economic  history  over the last century  and amply  confirmed  by
reactions  to the  two  oil shocks  of 1974  and 1979).
A  somewhat  more sophisticated  version  of the  resource  scarcity  idea
has been formulated  with particular  reference  to the oil market. Be it
because  of the oligopolistic  nature  of the  industry,  and/or  because  of the-14-
relatively  low  short-run  price  elasticities  of  both  demand  and  supply,  any
sudden  growth  spurt  could  generate  sharp  price  rises  of  the  kind  already
seen  in  1974  and  1979.  While,  in  many  ways,  this  would  seem  to  be  a  short-
run constraint  on growth  of the kind  reviewed  in Section  IV below,  a
repetition  of such  price  shocks  each  time  faster  grcoth  was attempted,
could  have destabilizing  effects  on longer-run  trends.  Indeed,  ic the
worst  c  all  possible  scenarios,  the  world  could  be  constrained  to  grow  at
a rate  dictated  by  (slowly)  expanding  energy  supply,  and  be,  in  addition,
subject  to sharp price fluctuations  consequent  upon OPEC decisions.
Experience  since  the  early  1980s,  when  such  forecasts  were  most  popular,
suggests,  however,  that,  just  as  for  other  raw  materials,  the  idea  of  an
"oil  ceiling"  permanently  restricting  growth  would  seem  to  be  unrealistic.
Though  the oil market  has been subject  to regular  cycles  and can be
expected  to remain  so [Petroleum  Finance  Company,  19871,  shocks  of the
strength  experienced  in  the  recent  past  are  unlikely.
While  not strictly  concerned  with  physical  scarcities,  a different
stagnationist  approach  has  stressed  the  idea  that  limits  to  growth  may  be
coming  from  the  progressive  exhaustion  of  what  have  been  the  main  engines
of expansion  in the  past.  The  gist  of the  argument  is that  growth  this
century  was concentrated  in areas of manufacturing  that generated
particularly  pronounced  economies  of scale,  as  well  as  strong  forward  aud
backward  linkage  effects.  Given  the  saturation  of  demand  for  many  of  these
goods,  the  scope  for  further  scale  economies  may  now  have  been  virtually
exhausted  in  the  OECD  area.  More  importantly,  it  would  also  be  argued  that
none  of the  new  products  that  have  been  discovered  in  the  last  10  or  15
years  have  the potential  for stimulating  growth  in other  parts  of the
economy  as  did,  for  instance,  the  major  durables  of  this  century.  While  it-15-
is undoubtedly  true that  many  of the industries  that  fuelled  post-war
growth  had powerful  effects  on other  sectors,  cars  being,  perhaps,  the
best  example,  earlier  technological  advances  had  similar  impacts  (witness
the effects  of railways  or of electricity),  and much recent  evidence
suggests  that the breakthroughs  in  electronics  and in  information
technology  are having  just  as pronounced,  if not even  more dramatic,
consequences  on  employment  and  on  activity.
Finally,  and  much  more  realistically,  the  view  has  been  expressed
that  a deceleration  in  growth  was inevitable,  at  least  in  Western  Europe
and  Japan,  as  these  areas  gradually  exhausted  the  possibility  of  catching-
up  on  America's  technological  lead.  As  productivity  levels  have  converged,
productivity  growth  in the  OECD  area  as a whole  has  become  increasingly
dependent  on the slow  outward  movement  of the technological  frontier,
rather  than  on  esay  and  quick  progrese  within  the  frontier  itself.  Such  a
view  has  its  limitations,  since  it  cannot  account  for  US  slowdown  (unless
the United  States  itself  was benefiting  from some catch-up  on the
depression  of the 1930s  [Baumol,  19861).  More  importantly,  it  can  hardly
explain  both  the  steadiness  of  growth  until  1973  and  the  suddeness  of  the
decelerations  that occurred  after 1973  and 1979.  Yet, the theory  is
plausible  as an explanation  of longer-run  trends  and is backed  by a
certain  amount of  empirical  evidence [Marris,  1982].  Before fully
accepting  its implication  that  the 19509  and 1960s  were,  for Western
Europe  and  Japan,  unLque,  non-repeatable,  experiences,  it  should,  however,
be  remembered  that  other  forces  may  exist,  or  emerge,  that  could  allow  a
resurgence  of rapid  growth.  Thus,  the technological  frontier  could  be
expected  to  move  rapidly  since  the  stock  of  human  capital  is  larger,  and
R&D and investment  ratios  are higher,  than  they  were  in  the 1950.  and-16-
1960s.  In  addition,  the  frontier  is  no  longer  being  expanded  solely  in  the
United  States,  but in  a  large  number  of countries  and in  particular  in
Japan.  Indeed,  as  the  latter  country  increasingly  shares  with  the  United
States  the  role  of technological  leader,  the  pace  of advance  could  well
accelerate.
Maturity  and  Ageing
A third  category  of stagnationist  theses,  stresses  instead  not so
much  physical  but  :ial  constraints  on growth,  and,  in  particular,  the
debilitating  effects  over  the  longer  run  of  prolonged  periods  of  rapidly
rising  material  wealth  and prosperity.  One,  very  simple,  version  of  such
approaches  focuses  on  the  idea  of  the  eventual  saturation  of  needs  in  the
developed  market  economies.  At its  crudest,  the  theory  suggests  that,  as
economies  get  richer,  their  inhabitants  no longer  desire  more  goods  and
services  with the same intensity  as in the past, thus increasingly
substituting  leisure  fov  work,  with  inevitable  consequences  for  the  growth
of  both  investment  and  output.  Few  econumists,  however,  would  take  such  an
approach  very seriously.  Quite apart from overlooking  the power of
technology  in  devising  new  and  attractive  products,  the  idea  ignores  the
well  known  strength  of  demonstration  effects  in  consumption  as  well  as  the
importance  of relative  rather  than of absolute  income  in determining
spending  patterns.  It  also  forgets  that:  "Even  in  the  richest  countries,  a
large  part  of the  population  is still  far  below  saturation  levels,  and
poverty  in an absolute  sense  has not yet disappeared"  [Bombach,  1985,
p.6].
A much  more  sophisticated  approach  to  longer  run  stagnation  comes
from  the  Schumpeterian  vision of  the  gradual, but  inevitable,-17-
transformation  of  modern capitalist  societies  (Schumpeter,  19521.
Continuing  growth  bringa  with  it  an  inescapable  centralization  of  economic
activities,  in  the  wake  of rising  cartellization  on -he  one  hand  and  the
requirements  of  scale  economies  on the other.  And centralization  is
accompanied  by the  emergence  of huge  and  ossified  bureaucratic  concerns
run  by conservative  managers  increasingly  resistant  to change  while  the
mythical  figure  of the  "entrepreneur"  slowly  disappears.  Yet,  it is  the
latter  who is  at the  heart  of  economic  growth  thanks  to  his  risk-taking
and innovating  activities.  In other  words,  the  stccesses  of the  early
stage  of capitalism  eventually  undermine  the  economic  foundations  of  the
system  itself  and create  the conditions  for its  downfall,  a view  both
similar  and  different  to  that  of  Marx.
That  much  economic  activity  has  been  increasingly  concentrated  over
the last  century  is undoubted,  as is the rise of large  (private  and
public)  bureaucracies.  Yet  socialism  has  not  become  the  dominant  form  of
society  in Western  countries  (though  social  democracy  probably  has in
Europe),  and  growth,  at  least  until  recently,  has  not  decelerated.  Indeed,
Schumpeter's  gloomy  forebodings  on the  inevitability  of decline  may  turn
out  to  have  been  exaggerated  on  more  than  one  count.  Recent  technological
progress  and, in particular,  the spreading  of electronics,  robots  and
flexible  manufacturing  systems,  may  well  provide  new  scope  for  small  scale
production  and  hence  revive  the  figure  of  the  "entrepreneur"  (as,  in  many
ways,  suggested  by  the  1970s  and  1980s  successes  of  small-scale  firms  in
many  countries,  and  especially  in  two  of  the  most  dynamic  economies  in  the
OECD  area  - Japan  and  Italy).
An alternative  view  of inevitable  decline,  which  is more  firmly
rooted  in  historical  evidence,  is  Olson's  thesis  of  gradual  institutional-18-
sclerosis  taking  hold  of  stable  and  prosperous  societies  [Olson,  1982].  A
characteristic  of such  societies  is the spreading  and strengthening  of
what  Olson  calls  "distributional  coalitions",,  in  other  words
organizations,  such  as professional  associations,  cartels,  trade  unions,
etc.,  whose  main aim is that  of pursuing  the interests  of their  own
members  at the  expense  of those  of society  as a whole.  The longer  the
period  of stability  during  which  these  groups  have strengthened  their
position,  the greater  their  retarding  effects  on growth.  Conversely,
periods  of  upheaval,  for  instance  wars,  foreign  invasions  or  revolutions,
tend to sweep  away such special  interest  organizations  and recreate
conditions  of greater  openness  and  competition  during  which  the  energies
of  society  are  again  devoted  to  wealth  creation  rather  than  solely  to  its
distribution.  The inevitability  of slowdown  arises  from the obvious
realization  that wars and revolutions,  at least  in advanced  Western
countries,  are  hardly  realistic  policy  options  to restore  growth,  while
even  a return  to  complete  free  trade  and  a  total  absence  of  impediments  to
firm or factor  mobility  may, in Olson's  view,  not be sufficient  to
outweigh  the  negative  influence  of  the  ubiquitous  cartels  and  lobbies.
The  weight  of  historical  material  assembled  by  Olson  to  document  his
thesis  is impressive  and,  no doubt,  a correlation  can  be found  between
social  upheavals  of one  sort  or  another  and  growth  accelerations,  in  some
countries  at least.  But,  whereas  defeat  in 1945  may  well have  spurred
growth  in  France,  Germany,  Italy  or  Japan,  similar  defeats  and  changes  in
political  regimes  had  much  less  of a perceptible  effect  in  the  American
South  after  the  Civil  War,  in  France  in  the  1870s,  or in  Austria  in  the
1920s. And,  in  the  opposite direction, periods of  increased
cartellization,  protectionism  and goverment  interference  in  the  economy,-19-
which  Olson  would  consider  as  clearly  inimical  to  growth,  were  associated
with  an improved  growth  performance  in,  for  instance,  Germany  in  the  two
decades  before  World  War I [Fremdling,  19861,  or in  Japan  in  the  19309
[Nakamura,  19831.  In other  words,  while  Olson  may well  have shown  the
importance  of one  particular  phenomenon,  his  messianic  concentration  on
it,  at the  expense  of  all  the  other  conditions  facilitating  or  allowing
growth,  makes  his  theory  less  than  all-encompassing.
What  all  the  views  so far  surveyed  have  in  common,  is  the  general
idea that prosperity,  success,  stability,  for one reason  or another,
generate  negative  feedbacks  on growth,  in  ways  reminiscent  of  biological
life-cycles.  Rather  than  success  breeding  further  success,  a view  that
received  a good  deal  of support  from  the  experience  of  many  countries  in
the 1950s and 1960s,  the argument  is that successful,  but ageing,
societies  build  up,  not  necessarily  inevitable  but  likely,  tendencies  to
slow  down  the  pace  of innovation.  investment  and  economic  progress.  The
reasons  for this may be varied  - clinging  to vested  interests,  the
temporary  pursuit  of  non-material  aims,  the  increased  bureaucratization  of
economic  life, or  the Marxist  view that since in full-employment
conditions  dismissals  "cease  to  play  their  role  as  a  disciplinary  measure"
[Kalecki,  1971,  p.l 40],  rates  of  profit  and  investment  are  reduced.
Within  the  OECD  area,  and  particularly  within  Europe,  a  symptom  of
such  a  malaise  could  well  be  the  massive  post-war  expansion  of  the  welfare
state.  Usually,  this  is seen  as an obstacle  to  growth  via its  negative
effects  on  investment  through  financial  crowding-out,  or  on  effort  because
of  high  taxation  and  social  security  benefits.  Yet,  rather  than  via  these
mechanisms  whose  direction  and empirical  magnitudes  remain  open  to  much
controversy,  a  more  subtle  growth-reducing  channel  may  have  been  at  work.-20-
The  increases  in  income  maintenance  ezpenditure,  the  mounting  provision  of
a variety  of  merit  goods,  the  strengthening  of  employment  guarantees,  may
well  trans  .;e  a desire  on the  part  of society  for  a greater  degree  of
economic  security.  Indeed,  in a  pessimistic  version  of this view,
prosperity  may well  diminish  people's  willingness  to  take  risks  and,  at
the same time, increase  their  expectations  of future  prosperity,  as
witnessed  by the spread  of what  have  been called  "conflicting  claims"
[McCracken  et  al.,  1977].  There  may  be  a  grain  of truth  in  such  views  of
the effects  of "maturity"  and  "age",  but these  effects  need not be
inevitable  either.  For one thing:  "The  Welfare  State  ...  constitutes  a
mode  of  conflict  resolution  and  a  means  of  mitigating  the  costs  of  change
that  would otherwise  induce  resistance  to growth"  [Abramovitz,  1986,
p.4041.  For  another,  rejuvenation  is possible,  not least  if protracted
sluggishness,  or  outright stagnation,  are  seen  to  be  the  only
alternatives.
Conclusions
It  has  been  characteristic  of  previous  periods  of  slowdown  that  they
generated  a gloomy  literature  on future  growth  prospects  (as  well  as on
the  imminent  collapse  of  capitalism).  This  was  the  case  at  the  time  of  the
so-called  "Great  Depression"  of the  1870s,  and  was even  more  so in  the
19309.  Subsequent  accelerations  in the  growth  tempo  at the  turn  of the
19th century,  or in the 19509  and 1960s,  put to rest  many of the
stagnationist  theories  of  the  time.  Arguably,  the  same  may  turn  out  to  be
true  in  this  instance.  A  cautionary  note,  however,  is  in  order.  There  may,
after  all,  be something  in  the  general  thesis  that  continued  stability  and
prosperity  may have slowed  down  the pace  of economic  change,  just  as-21-
prolonged  full  employ-ent  may  have  reduced  the  rate  of profit.  A greater
quest  for security  and  a  lower  propensity  to  engage  in  risky  activities
my  be hallmarks  of modern  industrial  societies  that  may temporarily
reduce  growth.  Yet,  that  reduction  may,  in  itself,  recreate  some  of the
conditions  necessary  for  a  renewed  upswing.-22-
III.  THE  CONDITIONS  FOR  GROWTH
The  preceding  section  has  suggested  that  low  growth  rates  of  the  kind
experienced  since  the  first  oil  shock  are  not  necessarily  inevitable.  But
neither  is  a return  to  higher  growth  rates.  Such  a return  would  require  a
set  of  favourable  conditions  which  may  not  be  easily  forthcoming.  It is
the  aim  of this  section  to explore  what  such  conditions  might  be in  the
light  of previous  experiences  of rapid  growth  in the industrialized
countries.  After  a  brief  survey  of  some  of  the  major  theoretical  views  of
what  determines  the  growth  process,  the  text  looks  at  selected  episodes  of
the  economic  history  of  the  last  century  or  so,  and,  in  particular,  at  the
reasons  for  the  remarkable  acceleration  in  growth  recorded  after  World  War
II.
The  Supply  Potential
The  standard,  textbook,  presentation  of  economic  growth  is  based  on
the neo-classical  paradigm.  In this view of the world,  the major
determinants  of growth  are exogenous  rates  of population  growth  and
technological  progress  and a  given investment  ratio.  The production
function  then  determines  a "natural"  rate  of growth  of the  economy.
Changes  in the  investment  ratio  may  affect  this  growth  rate  temporarily,
but,  in  the  long  run,  they  are  offset  by  changes  in  capital-output  ratios.
Potential  growth  l+.as  proceeds  smoothly  along  a  given  path,  even  if  actual
growth  may  deviate  from it  temporarily  because  of  business  cycle
fluctuations.
This  view  of the  world  would  seem  unable,  however,  to provide  a
convincing  explanation  for  the  "convulsive  structural,  technological,  and
social  changes"  [Nordhaus  and  Tobin,  1972,  p.21  which  have  characterized-23-
the past  development  of the industrialized  countriest  "Ceneral  economic
growth  as  we  have  known  it  is  not  a  balanced,  steady-state  affair;  ...  the
historical  process  of  growth  ...  may  best  be  viewed  as  part  of  a sequence
of technologically  induced  traverses,  disequilibrium  transitions  between
successive  growth  paths"  (Abramovitz  and  David,  1973,  p.4291.  There  would,
indeed,  seem  to be little  "natural"  about  the sudden  changes  in trend
growth  rates  that  the world  has ezperienced  over  the  last  two  hundred
years,  such  as  the  long  waves  of  acceleration  and  deceleration  in  the  19.h
century,  let  alone  the  sharp  breaks  in  trend  witnessed  after  1945  or  1973.
The  major  difficulty  with  neo-classical  growth  theory  is  probably  the
idea of an exogenously  given "potential"  growth  rate. This assumes
explicitly  that the three  main arguments  in the production  function
(capital,  labour  and  technology)  are independent  of the growth  process
itself.  Yet, there is strong  evidence  for the existence  of mutual
causation,  in which  case  high  growth  rates  could  well  have  favourable
influences  on  the  supplies  of  factor  inputs,  while  low  growth  rates  might
act  in  the  opposite  direction.  Such  interdependence  is  most  easily  seen  in
the  case  of  capital.  Though  there  are,  no  doubt,  several  important  factors
that  determine  the  rate  of  private  investment  at  any  particular  time,  both
theoretical  arguments  and empirical  evidence  strongly  suggest  that
expected  demand  growth  is  a major  one.  If  the  accelerator  matters,  then
growth  affects  capital  accumulation  just  as  much  as  capital  accumulation
affects  growth.
Technological  progress,  on  the  other  hand,  could  be  autonomous  if  one
were  to  accept  a "science-based"  view  of  innovation,  with  new  products  and
processes  generated  primarily  by  the  advance  of  scientific  knowledge.  Yet,
this  view  seems  more  applicable  to  the  earlier  days  of industrialization-24-
when major  technological  breakthroughs  may well have generated  upward
shifts in investment,  than to modern  times.  Nowadays,  research  is
predominantly  carried  out  in the  industrial  laboratories  of  large  firms,
rather than by  individual  inventors,  and  the economic  impact  of
innovations  is often less important  than  are the effects  of gradual
improvements  in processes  made subsequent  to the innovation's  initial
application  (Enos,  1962].  Indeed,  the  opposite,  demand-induced  view,  which
sees  "necessity  as the  mother  of  invention"  (Could,  1972],  would  seem  to
be backed  by stronger  evidence.  The  endogenous  nature  of  much  technical
progress  is suggested  by the  close  links  between  innovations  in  a  number
of industries  and  those  industries'  prior  growth  in  sales  and  investment
[Schmookler,  19661.  More  generally:  "A  considerable  number  of  scholars  of
technological  advance  have  well  documented  the  role  of  strong  demand  for  a
particular  product  in stimulating  innovative  efforts  to improve  it or
improve  its production  processes,  the effects  of shortages  ... for a
particular  input  in stimulating  innovation  to save  on the use  of that
input,  and  of  high  expectations  for  a  potential  market  ...  in  stimulating
exploratory  work to find  a satisfactory  design  or production  process"
(Nelson,  1981,  p.168].
An endogenous  view  of population  growth  would  seem  to be more
difficult  to  defent Labour  force  and  employment  growth,  however,  respond
to changes  in  aggregate  demand,  as shown  by increases  (or  decreases)  in
participation  rates  through  the cycle  and in migration  flows through
longer  phases  of acceleration  and deceleration.  More importantly,  if
productivity  levels  across  sectors  differ,  changes  in  aggregate  demand  can
lead  to changes  in the labour  force's  sectoral  disposition  and  thereby
contribute  to  changes  in  overall  growth  rates.-25-
"Engines"  of  Growth
The  foregoing  suggests  that  the  concept  of an  exogenous  "natural"
rate  of growth  may  not  be a very  useful  tool  for  an  examination  of why
growth  rates  change  through  time.  An  alternative  approach  that  may  provide
better  insights  might  be one that  stressed  s  me  particular  crucial  factor
that could be described  as the "engine"  of growth.  In a  short-run
Keynesian  framework,  this  couid  be represented  by an exogenous  demand
component,  e.g. investment,  exports,  or government  expe  diture.  In an
interpretation  of  longer-rup  classical  theory,  the  crucial  factor  would  be
capital  accumulation  tStreissler,  1980].  Finally,  in  a Schumpeterian  view
of  the  world,  the  spur  to  growth  would  come  from  the  bunching  of  technical
innovations  leading  to an  upsurge  in  entrepreneurial  activity  and
investment.
The  element  common  to  all  three  approaches,  as  also  to  the  Marxist
view  of  expansion  and  crisis,  is  investment.  There  are  a  number  of  reasons
for  why  investment  may  be  viewed  as  a  particularly  important  component  of
growth.  First,  investment  creates  both  new supply,  via its  effects  on
capacity,  and  extra  demand,  via  the  multiplier.  Second,  investment  is  the
essential  vehicle  for the  embodiment  of technological  progress.  Third,
investment  can have favourable  effects  on disembodied  technological
progress  as  well  - it  is  frequently  only  thanks  to  the  introduction  of  new
equipment  that  factory floors or  offices are  redesigned,  that
organizational  improvements  are  made,  that  X-inefficiency  is  diminished.
Fourth,  it  is  almost  exclusively  through  investment  that  scale  economies
can  be  achieved.  Finally,  a good  deal  of  "learning  by  doing"  takes  place
in  the  wake  of  higher  investment  flows.-26-
The  stress  here  put  on  investment  might  seem  to  suggest  a  dangerously
monocausal  theory  of growth.  In  particular,  it  might  give  the  impression
that technological  progress,  which  many would consider  "the ultimate
constraint  on  the  rate  of  growth  of  national  income"  [Lewis,  1978,  p.155],
was  being  ignored.  Yet  this  is not so.  As argued  above,  technology  and
investment  are  closely  linked  through  the  demand  impact  of  high  investment
onto  the  pace  of innovation  itself  and  via  embodiment  effects:  "Without
gross  investment,  improving  technology  ...  simply  represents  a potential
for higher productivity:  to realise  thii potential  requires  gross
investment"  [Salter,  1966,  p. 631.  Hence,  stressing  the  role  of investment
is tantamount  to  stressing  also the role of technology.  Moreover,
investment  is  measurable,  while  technological  progress  is  not,  and,  partly
as  a consequence,  can  be  more  easily  influenced  by  government  policies.  It
is  true,  of  course,  that  not  all  investment  will  always  be  productive,  be
this  because  of lack  of complementary  factors,  or because  of mistaken
entrepreneurial  or  government  decisions,  but  such  a conclusion  can  apply
to any input,  including  innovation,  and does  not, per se, suffice  to
invalidate the  longer-run growth-promoting  effects of  capital
accumulation.
More  importantly,  the  present  approach  would  seem  to  run  counter  both
to  neo-classical  theory  and  to  many  of  the  findings  of  growth  accounting
exercises.  The clash  with neo-classical  theory,  however,  may be more
apparent  than  real.  Even  if  that  body  of  theory  were  right  in  postulating
the  invariance  of the  growth  rate  with  respect  to the  investment  ratio,
this  result  would  only  pertain  to  the  very  long  run  and  still  leave  open
the  possibility  that  shifts  from  one  growth  path  to  another  are  determined
by changes  in  the  rate  of capital  accumulation.  More  damning  may  be  the-27-
evidence  gleaned from growth accounting  exercises  which, in their
quantification  of the  sources  of  growth,  often  attribute  a small  role  to
capital.  Thus,  Denison,  in his well-known  international  investigations,
"explains"  only  18  per  cent  of  Western  Europe's  growth  from  1950  to 1962
through  capital  formation,  and, even more surprisingly,  limits  the
contribution  of investment  in  Japan's  case  to  barely  24  per  cent  for  the
years 1953-71  [Denison,  1967;  Denison  and Chung,  1976].  More recent
estimates,  however,  suggest  somewhat  larger  contributions  from  capital  to
growth  - for the  years  1950-73,  these  lie  between  32 and  50 per  cent,
depending  on the  country,  with  much  higher  figures  for  earlier  and  later
periods  [Maddison,  19871.
Not too  much  should  be read  into  these  various  results,  given  the
well-known  limitations  of  the  growth  accounting  methodology,  particularly
as applied  to capital  [Scott,  19761,  and its inability  to incorporate
dynamic  interactions.  Better  evidence  can be obtained  from economic
historians  who  have  frequently  pointed  to  the  leading  role  of investment
in  the growth process:  "The evidence  ...  does not suggest  close
correlation  between  rates  of growth  and levels  of capital  formation
between  countries.  It is generally  true,  however,  that  within  any  one
country  increases  in the proportion  of resources  devoted  to capital
formation  tended  to  be  correlated  with  increases  in  growth  rates"  [Milward
and Saul,  1977,  p.519,  emphasis  added].  And this summary  judgment  is
broadly  confirmed  by  most,  if  not  all,  the  careful  studies  of individual
countries'  experience,  contained  in the Cambridge  Economic  History  of
Europe  [Mathias  and Postan,  1978]  or  by separate  monographs  (Fua,  1965;
Matthews,  1968;  Ohkawa  and  Rosovsky,  1973;  Clismann  et  al.,  1978;  Minami,
19861.-28-
If  investment  is  indeed  the  main  proximate  engine  of  growth,  the  next
question  is to try and  determine  what  are  its  moving  forces.  One view
would  be to attribute  its strength  at particular  times  to changes  in
saving  propensities.  The  difficulty  with  this  approach  is,  of  course,  that
causation  can run  in  both directions.  Thus, increases  in  saving
propensities  could  be the reason  for high investment,  just  as rising
investment,  by boosting  income,  could  generate  high  savings.  If savings
were  the  truly  exogenous  variable,  one  might  expect,  in  the  presence  of
international  capital  mobility,  that  domestic  saving  and  investment  ratios
would  not necessarily  be correlated.  Thus,  countries  which,  because  of
demographic,  social  or  other  reasons,  had  high  saving  propensities,  would
normally  export  capital  to countries  in which investment  tended  to
outstrip  domestic  savings.  Yet,  research  has shown  that  over  the last
forty  years  most  developed  countries'  gross  fixed  capital  formation  has
been closely  correlated  with domestic  savings,  while current  account
balances  have  acted  as merely  "temporary  shock  absorbers"  (Penati  and
Dooley,  1984,  p. 221. This finding  provides  no conclusive  proof  of the
primacy  of investment,  since  the  correlation  may  still  be  compatible  with
causation  running  from  rising  domestic  savings,  through  a falling  cost  of
capital,  to  a greater  incentive  for  domestic  investment,  but  it  does  make
the  Keynesian  hypothesis  somewhat  more  plausible.
Further  indirect  evidence  suggesting  that savings  may be the
dependent  variable  can  be obtained  from  the  work  of  economic  historians.
Lewis,  for instance,  puts  the  case  forcefully  when  he argues  that  for
industrial  countries:  "The  savings  ratio  ...  depends  endogenously  on the
rate  of  growth:  it  is  low  when  the  growth  rate  is  low,  as  in  contemporary
USA,  and high  when  the growth  rate  is  high,  as in contemporary  Japan"-29-
[Lewis,  1982,  p.1053.  Broad  confirmation  of  this  proposition  is  contained
in  all  three of  the published  histories  of  long-term  growth in
industrialized  countries  launched  by  Abramovitz  and  Kuznets  (Carre  et  al.,
1972;  Ohkawa  and  Rosovsky,  1973;  Matthews  et  al.,  19821.  The  conclusions
reached for Japan are particularly  striking:  "Savings  are  ...  an
essentially  dependent  process  whose  key determinants  are the rate  of
growth  and the level  of income"  [Ohkawa  and Rosovsky,  1973,  p.1721.
Admittedly,  however,  the  American  case  is less  clear-cut.  Some  authors
suggest  that  neither  the  secular  rise  in 19th  century  savings,  nor the
secular  fall in 20th  century  savings  were autonomous  (Abramovitz  and
David,  19731,  but  others  have  argued  that  in  the  19th  century,  at least,
it  was  savings  that  led  investment  [Davis  and  Gallman,  1978].
An alternative,  and  possibly  more  fruitful,  approach  would  look  at
standard  theories  of investment  determination.  At the risk of gross
simplification,  two  major  and  conflicting  perspectives  stand  out.  The  neo-
classical  view  would  stress  the  importance  of  profits,  the  Keynesian  view
the importance  of  demand.  Yet, the differences  between  these two
approaches  are  not  unsurmountable.  First,  the  empirical  evidence  strongly
suggests  that  profits  and  demand  are,  for  good  reasons,  closely  correlated
wich each  other.  And  second,  both  approaches  would,  presumably,  agree  that
what  matters  are  not  so  much  actual  profits  or  demand  (even  if  it  is  these
that  are almost  always  used  in econometric  application.),  but expected
profits  or  demand.  In  other  words,  the  major  force  determining  investment
may  be  the  presence  of  optimistic  expectations  about  the  future  course  of
either  profits  and/or  activity.
Much  more  difficult  is  to  answer  the  question  as  to  what  determines
such optimistic  expectations.  In a Schumpeterian  interpretation,  these-30-
would  be  generated  by  the  disruptive  effects  of  a  new  wave  of  innovations
and  the  entrepreneurial  response  to  this: "Entrepreneurial  supply
activities  rather  than demand  mechanics  (are the) driving  forces  in
economic  development"  [Giersch,  1979,  p.630].  Even if the empirical
evidence  for the presence  of discontinuous  jumps  in innovations  is  not
particularly  strong,  the  Schumpeterian  approach  can  be  modified  and  fitted
into  a framework  in  which  it  is  still  primarily  supply  forces  that  allow
investment  growth.  Technological  breakthroughs  are  now  only  one  condition
for  dynamic  entrepreneurial  activity;  others  are an abundant  supply  of
factors  complementary  to  investment,  the absence of  institutional
constraints  and rigidities,  low interest  rates  or real  wages,  and a
flexible  price  system  (ibid.].
In contrast,  a more  Keynesian-oriented  interpretation,  while  not
ignoring  the  permissive  role  of  favourable  supply  conditions,  would  stress
the  importance  of  a high  and  stable  pressure  of  demand,  achieved  thanks  to
either  buoyant  world  markets  or,  possibly,  the  role  of  domestic  policies:
"Sufficient  demand  is  the  main  determinant  of  optimistic  expectations,  and
this is a  necessary  though  not sufficient  precondition  for growth"
(Bombach,  1985,  p.71],  or  again:  "It  is  more  or less  self-evident  that  a
sufficiently  high  and  stable  demand  pressure  is  a  necessary  condition  for
a  high  rate  of  growth"  [Lundberg,  1981,  p.452].
This  may  not  be the  end  of the  list.  Expectations  are  an elusive
concept  and similarly  elusive  are the reasons  for the appearance  or
disappearance  of Keynesian  "animal  spirits"  or of dynamic  Schumpeterian
entrepreneurs.  Many would stress the further  need for an  orderly
international  monetary  system.  Others  would  also  suggest  that  investment
is  unlikely  to  be  undertaken  in  conditions  in  which  corporate  indebtedness-31-
is  very  high,  as indirectly  shown  by  the  favourable  effects  on  confidence
of the destruction  of financial  debt that  occurred  in many countries
during  and after  World  War II [Abramovitz,  1979].  Further  conditions
strengthening favourable  expectations could  be  technological
breakthroughs,  such  as  the  railways  in  the  middle  of  the  19th  century;  the
presence  of cheap  labour  (as in the United  States  in the late 19th
century),  or in  Europe  in  the  post-war  period  (Kindleberger,  19671);  the
invigorating  impact  of  free  trade  (as  in  Germany  with  the  creation  of  the
Zollverein  in the  1830s  (Henderson,  19715),  or  of  (limited)  protectionism
(as  in  the  cases  of  France,  Germany  or  the  United  States  at  the  beginning
of  this  century  (Arrow,  19861),  etc.
To  test  for the significance  of these  various  factors  may be a
virtually  impossible  task,  if only  because  the  counterfactuals  in  most
instances  cannot  be constructed.  Instead,  the  following  paragraphs  will
briefly  examine  some selected  periods  of the economic  history  of the
industrialized  countries  and,  in  particular,  episodes  of acceleration  or
relatively  rapid  growth  to try  to see,  in  a rough  and  qualitative  way,
what  made  these  possible.  The  emphasis  is  on  phases  of  some  two  decades  or
more  in duration,  rather  than  on shorter-term  business  cycle  upswings,
since  the  subject  matter  of this  paper  is the  medium-term  outlook.  The
emphasis  is also  on the  experience  of all  the industrialized  countries
together,  since  for  individual  countries  rapid  growth  may  always  have  been
possible  thanks  to  an  export-led  mechanism.
Table  3  and  Figures  1  to  3  present  a  picture  of  the  growth  of  what  is
now  the  OECD  area  for  just  over  one  century.  Excluding  periods  of  war  and
reconstruction  (i.e.  the  years  1913-22  and  1937-52),  the  data  suggest  that
there  was really  only  one  major  phase  of very  rapid  expansion  in the-32-
industrialized  world  as  a whole:  1952-73.  The  Victorian  era,  tLe  interwar
years  and the  post-oil  shock  period  witnessed  growth  rates  that  were,  on
average,  a good  deal  lower  (and  quite  close  to  each  other).  There  is  sone
evidence,  however,  of a modest  acceleration  in the  growth  tempo  towards
the  end  of the  19th  century  (which  would  almost  certainly  be stronger  if
GNP  data  were  available  for  Russia),  and  a  much  more  restricted  data  base
suggests  that  a similar  acceleration  may  also  have  occurred  in  the  early
1850s  and lasted  until  the  early  1870s,  at least  in some  of the  major
European  economies,  if  not  in  North  America  (Table  4).
Nineteenth  Century  Experience
By  the  standards  of  the  20th  century,  output  growth  in  the  Victorian
era  appears  to  have  been  very  smooth  indeed.  Though  rapid  growth  phases
can be gleaned  from the data, and have often  been discussed  in the
literature  on  Kondratieff  cycles,  there  are  hardly  any  momentous  medium-
term  accelerations  comparable  to  what  was  witnessed  after  World  War  II.
Hence,  any lessons  that  can  be drawn  from  this  period  may  be  of  limited
value  only.  This  is  the  more  so,  of  course,  as  the  structure  of  the  late
19th  century  economy  (and,  a fortiori,  that of the mid-19th  century
economy)  was  very  different  from  that  of  a  today's  typical  OECD  country.
In general,  economic  histories  of this  period  have  focussed  on
individual  countries'  experiences  and/or  on the pattern  of cyclical
fluctations.  Surveys  or  explanations  of  what  determined  accelerations  for
the world economy  as  a  whole are less frequent.  Two major,  and
conflicting,  interpretations  have been put forward  by monetarist  and
marxist  economists.  For  the  former,  of  whom  a  major  proponent  was  Cassel,
the  gold  discoveries  of the  early  1850s  and  of  the  early  1890s,  played  a-33-
very  important  role,  in  a  monetary  system  that  was  still  closely  geared  to
gold,  in  generating  upward  pressures  on both  prices  and  output.  For  the
latter,  the favourable  stimulus  to business  expectations  came,  instead,
from more political  shocks  - wars, throughout  the period,  colonial
expansion  from  the  1880s,  increased  military  spending  from  the  turn  of  the
century  (Mandel,  19801.
The  available  quantitative  evidence  lends  little  support  to  either
interpretation.  The  ratio  of  the  world's  gold  stock  to  international  trade
fell steadily  throughout  the 19th  century,  even if at times  of new
discoveries  this  movement  slowed  down  (Bairoch,  1976].  More  importantly,
research  on the 1850s  suggests  little  causal  link  between  expansion  and
gold  discoveries  [Rostow,  1980],  while  work  on  the  three  decades  to  World
War I shows  that  the  relationship  between  the  quantity  of  gold  and the
money  supply  in both  Britain  and the  United  States  was  highly  unstable
(Lewis,  19781.  As for  the  role  of  expansion  overseas,  it  would  seem  that
the  rise  in the  share  of European  exports  to  what  would  today  be  called
the  third  world  was  far  too  small,  even  in  the  years  1890-1913,  to  provide
more  than  a very  minor  contribution  to  growth  [Bairoch,  1976]:  "For  the
economic  growth  of  the  core,  the  periphery  was  peripheral"  (O'Brien,  1982,
p.l8].  Wars  and  rising  military  spending  may  have  been  more  important  in
stimulating  growth  in some instances,  but the lively  debate  on the
economic  effects  of the  American  Civil  War  confirms  that  conclusions  on
this  issue  are  far  from  easy.
An  alternative  set  of  explanations  can  be  sought  in  the  foreign  trade
area.  Thus,  it  could  be  argued  that  the  spread  of  free  trade  in  the  1850s
and  1860s  stimulated  growth,  or,  alternatively,  that  the  generalization  of
protection  in  Continental  Europe  and  in  the  United  States  from  the  1880s-34-
to  World  War  I  had  a similar  effect.  The  former  thesis  has  few  adherents,
if  only  because  the  1870s,  during  which  free  trade  was  still  prevalent,
were  a period  of  somewhat  lower  growth.  Indeed,  it  has  even  been  suggested
that  the  most  free  trading  country  of  all,  Britain,  actually  suffered  real
income  losses  from  its  decision  to  reduce  tariffs  [McCloskey,  19801.  The
latter  interpretation,  on the  other  hand,  has  had  more  support,  guarded
(at  best)  in  the  case  of the  United  States  [Engerman,  1971;  Williamson,
1974],  but  very  explicit  in  the  case  of  Europe  [Bairoch,  19761.  Here  too,
however,  it  must  be remembered  that  European  protectionism  begins  already
in  the  early  1880s  and  is  mainly  directed  at rescuing  agriculture,  while
the  acceleration  in (industrial)  growth  comes  only  in  the  early  to  mid-
1890s.
No final  conclusion  is possible,  despite  the  existence  of very
firmly,  indeed  dogmatically,  held  views  on this  issue.  The  connections
between  growth  and  foreign  trade  are  not  only  complex,  but  also  likely  to
vary  according  to  time  and  place:  "Increased  exports,  decreased  exports,
increased  imports  (perhaps  through  lower tariffs),  decreased  imports
(perhaps  through  higher  tariffs),  all  or  any  can  either  stimulate  growth
or slow  it  down  ...  Not  every  kick  in  the  pants  galvanizes;  some  merely
hurt"  [Kindleberger,  1978,  p.410,  emphasis  added).
A more  eclectic  explanation  for  the  accelerations  of  the  mid-  and
late 19th  century,  would  probably  start  by stressing  normal  cyclical
recoveries  from  the  recessions  of  the  late  1840.  and  1880.  which  were  then
strengthened  and lengthened  by some special  factors.  In the earlier
period,  an extremely  important  and  very  buoyant  component  of investment
was railway construction,  often, but not  always,  undertaken  with
government  help; in the latter  period,  there  was no similar  leading-35-
sector,  but innovations  (e.g.  in steel,  chemicals  and electricity)  may
have  played  some  role  in  stimulating  capital  formation  (Van  Duijn,  1983],
as may the  accelerated  fall  in freight  rates  [Bairoch,  19761.  To these
technological  factors  can perhaps  be added the effects  of the gold
discoveries  and  of  protectionism.  More  importantly,  military  expenditures,
particularly  in  the  first  decade  of  the  20th  century,  seem  to  have  had  a
marked  growth-promoting  effect.
A further  interpretation  relates  to  the  major  actors  of  the  growth
process.  Investment  in the  1850. and 1860sf  though  influenced  by
government  policies  in  some  countries,  was  still  overwhelmingly  undertaken
by what  one could  call  Schumpeterian  entrepreneurs.  By the  turn  of the
century,  however,  the  role  of government  in stimulating  investment  had
increased.  be this  directly  through  nationalized  industries  and  military
demand,  or indirectly  via protectionism  extended  to domestic  industry
[Supple,  1973].  This  was  least  the  case  in  Britain  and  the  United  States
(Zhough  protectionism  in the latter  country  was widespread),  and most
obviously  so  in  latecomer  countries,  such  as  Russia  and  Japan,  but  it  was
also apparent  elsewhere  in Continental  Europe.  Differences  with the
earlier  period  were  only  moderate,  so  that  it  would  be  exaggerated  to  talk
of  a  "'regime  change",  but  if  one  were  to  look  for  a "system  shock"  that
could  throw  light  on  the  late  19th  century  acceleration,  one  might  wish  to
focus  on the increased  role  of what today  would  be called  industrial
policies.
1952-1973
By  far  the  most  exceptional  growth  phase  the  Western  world  has  ever
experienced  (if one excludes  the rather  special  circumstances  of the-36-
reconstruction  years  after  World  War  II),  was  the  so-called  "golden  age"
of  the  1950.  and  1960s.  During  the  two  decades  to  the  watershed  set  by  the
first  oil  shock,  output  growth  was  close  to  5  per  cent  per  annum,  cyclical
fluctuations  were  extremely  mild  by  the  standards  of  0arlier  periods  and
unemployment  virtually  disappeared  in most OECD countries.  A  further
notable  feature  of  these  years  was  the  sharp  rise  in  capital  accumulation.
Pre-1950  investment  data  are poor,  but the  available  estimates  suggest
that  the non-residential  investment  to GNP ratio  was some  75 per  cent
higher  in Europe  in the years 1950-70  than in the interwar  period
[Maddison,  1976],  whose  ratios  were,  in  turn,  equal.  to,  or  higher  than,
those  of the  years  to 1913  lKuznets,  19661.  The same  is true  for  Japan
[Ohkawa  and  Shinohara,  1979]  (but  net  for  the  United  States  for  which  both
growth  rates  and  investment  ratios  were  highest  in  the  19th  century).
While  a number  of authors  have looked  at the reasons  for the
relatively  pronounced  differences  in  performance  auross  countries  in  this
period  [Kaldor,  1966;  Denison,  1967;  Kindleberger,  19671,  few  have  studied
the  more  general  issue  of  overall  acceleration.  Some  of  the  explanations
that  have  been  put forward  stress  the favourable  impact,  at least  for
Europe  and  Japan,  of cheap  labour  and  cheap  technology  [Maddison,  1964;
Kindleberger,  1967;  Cornwall,  1977].  The  abundance  of  underemployed  labour
resources  in  agriculture  or  in  countries  of  emigration,  on the  one  hand,
and  the  presence  of  a  large  technological  gap  vis-a-vis  the  United  States,
on the  other,  did,  in  this  view,  concur  in  boosting  profit  expectations,
profits  themselves  and  ultimately  investment.
Such  an  explanation  would  seem  eminently  plausible.  It  is  well  known
that the 1950s  and 1960s  witnessed  a massive  influx  of labour  into
indus:ry  from  agriculture  and,  in  North-Western  Europe,  also  from  other-37-
countries,  and it  is  highly  likely  that  this  labour  force  was  relatively
cheap  and flexible.  Equally,  it is well known that  Europe  and Japan
borrowed  technology  from the  United  States  on a very large  scale,  as
shown,  directly,  by  the  latter  country's  large  balance  of  payments  surplus
on patent  and  royalties  account,  and  the  direct  investment  activities  of
its  multinationals,  and  as  suggested,  indirectly,  by  the  transformation  of
European  and Japanese  industry  towards  what many would call a  US
production  model.
The  explanation,  however,  has  a  serious  limitation  since  it  is  unable
to discriminate  between  circumstances  in this period  and in earlier
periods  of the economic  histories  of Europe  and Japan.  Thus,  surplus
agricultural  labour  was  present  in  even  greater  quantities  during  the  19th
century  and in  the  first  half  of  the  20th  century,  as shown  by the  very
high  proportions  of the labour  force  employed  on the  land  at  the  time.
Similarly,  migration  flows  were  possible,  and  indeed  occurred  on  a large
scale  at the turn  of the century  from  Europe  to North  America.  Yet,
despite  the  presence  of cheap  labour  supplies,  neither  Europe  nor  Japan
were  able  to  achieve  the  growth  rates  that  were  recorded  in  the  period
under  examination.
More  surprisingly,  perhaps,  the  same  argument  can  also  be  applied  to
the  technology-based  explanation.  It  is  undoubtedly  true  that,  after  World
War II, the United  States'  technological  lead  was overwhelming.  But a
technological  gap  vis-a-vis  the  United  States  had  also  existed  well  before
1945,  even  if  its  size  may  not  have  been  quite  as pronounced  as it-was
then,  as  shown  by  Table  5  which  presents  data  on  GDP  per  man-hour  taken  as
a rough  proxy  for  technological  achievement.  Though  these  very  aggregate
findings  are clearly  tentative,  they are confirmed  by more careful-38-
microeconomic  research  which  suggests  that,  depending  on industry  and
country,  US  firms  were  from  1  1/2  to  4 times  more  productive  than  s  ilar
European  firms  already  at the beginning  of the  20th  century  [Taussig,
19241.  It  is  true  that  in  the  post-war  period  the  awareness  of  this  gap  in
knowledge  and the facilities  for the dissemination  of technclogy  were
almost  certainly  greater  than  at  earlier  stages  [Abramovitz,  1979],  but  it
remains  nonetheless  true  that  a large  gap  did  ezist  before  World  War  II
and  was  unisble,  even  combined  with  abundant  and  cheap  labour,  to  generate
the  "super  growth"  of  the  1950s  and  1960s.
The  search  for  an  explanation  thus  has  to  look  for  factors  that  were
either  not  present  in earlier  periods,  or, if  present,  were  able  to  act
more powerfully  on this occasion.  One such factor  may have been the
influence  of the post-World  War II reconstruction  years  on subsequent
attitudes  and  expectations.  Growth  during  this  .period  was  extremely  rapid
in Continental  Europe  and  in  Japan  (of  the  order  of 8 1/2  per  cent  per
annum  between  1946  and 1952),  in  marked  contrast,  for instance,  to the
relatively  sluggish  performance  that  followed  World  War  I.  Such  a tempo,
by itself,  may have  generated  optimistic  expectations.  In  addition,  the
reconstruction  years  saw  the  coming  to  power  of  new  elites  in  a  number  of
countries  [Olson,  19821  and, more importantly,  the adoption  of new
policies.  While  after  World  War  I,  the  major  economic  aim  of  governments
had  been  that  of restoring  the  conditions  that  had  prevailed  until  1913,
such  a backward-looking  attitude  was,  for obvious  reasons,  out of the
question  after  1945.  Instead,  policy  makers  embarked  on  reconstruction  in
a new and  more interventionist  framework,  exemplified  by the  ambitious
targets  put  forward  by  the  first  French  plan.-39-
A second  important  difference,  at  least  with  the  interwar  period,  is
to  be found  in the  international  economy.  While  the  1920s  and  1930.  had
been  characterized  by  mounting  protectionism,  massive  speculative  capital
flows,  and floating  exchange  rates,  the  system  created  at Bretton  Woods
and  strengthened  by the  farsighted  American  decisions  to  extend  Marshall
aid  and  cancel  the  bulk  of  war  debts,  ushered  in  a  period  of  unprecedented
trade  liberalization  and almost  unprecedented  exchange  rate stability.
Both  of these  may  well  have  buoyed  up expectations  and growth,  despite
Keynes'  original  fear  that  the  Bretton  Woods  system  contained  an implicit
deflationary  bias.
That fear  arose  probably  from the earlier  experience  of fixed
exchange  rates  under  the  gold  standard  of  the  years  1875  to  1913,  a  period
in  which  British  growth,  in  particular,  had  been  relatively  low.  But  quite
apart  from  other  changes  in circumstances,  one  major  difference  between
these  two eras lay in the role and strength  of the reserve  currency
country.  Unlike  Britain,  with its relatively  small  gold reserves,  the
United  States  could  afford  to  be  unconcerned  with  its  balance  of  payments
for  a prolonged  period  of  time.  Ultimately,  this  "benign  neglect"  led  to
the  downfall  of the  Bretton  Woods  system,  but,  while  it  lasted,  it  meant
that  Europe  and  Japan  could  grow  rapidly  without  being  forced  to  curtail
their expansion  by the appearance  of external  constraints.  On  the
contrary,  their  reserves  went on increasing  thanks  to US balance  of
payment  deficits,  while  their  growth  was  being  pulled  up  by  US  demand.  In
other  words,  both areas benefited,  in many ways, from the kind of
conditions  that  favour  an  export-led  growth  process  [Beckerman,  19621.
Thirdly,  and perhaps  most importantly,  the post-war  period  was
characterized  by a  further  and  more  novel  regime  change  - the  explicit  or-40-
implicit  commitment  by  a large  number  of  governments  to  the  maintenance  of
full  employment  and/or  the achievement  of rapid  growth.  At one level,
these  commitments  elicited  direct  and indirect  intervention  in capital
formation  in  both  infrastructure  and  basic  industries.  The Schumpeterian
entrepreneurs  of  the  1950s "operated  in  and  through  government"
[Abramovitz,  1979,  p.25].  But  the  commitments  may  well  have  had  an even
more  important  and subtler  effect. The  war  years  had  given  governments
much  higher  levels  of taxation  and  a much  greater  array  of instruments
with  which to intervene  in the economy.  The Keynesian  revolution  had
provided  the  same  governments  with  a  new  theory  which  showed  that  counter-
cyclical policies could avoid  the  recurrence  of  those business
fluctuations  which, until then, had been thought  of as  inev.table
accompaniments  of a market  economy. Arguably,  therefore,  the  commitment
looked  credible, thus  boosting entrepreneurial  expectations  and
contributing  to the  high  rates  of investment  that  were  recorded.  As long
as  private  agents  believed  in  the  implicit  Keynesian  model  that  dominated
most  economic  policy  discussions  of  the  period,  and  also  believed  in  the
efficacy  of  policies,  their  behaviour  would  incorporate  such  expectations
and turn  out to be stabilizing  in its  own  right  [Baily,  1978;  Boltho,
19821.
This interpretation  cannot  hold,  of course,  equally  for all
countries.  In  some, for  instance  the United States,  Britain,  or
Scandinavia,  the Keynesian  message  was received  much earlier  and more
favourably  than in others,  for instance  Germany  or Italy.  But even  in
these  countries  (and  even  more  so  in France  or Japan),  governments  were
more  active  than  before,  if not  always  in  attempting  to manage  demand,
then in trying  to stimulate  faster  growth  and, in particular,  higher-41-
investment:  "The mixed economy  itself,  run on Keynesian  economic
principles,  generated  dynamic  growth"  [Van  der  Wee,  1986,  p.54].
And this  view  is  able  to  throw  light  not  only  on the  reasons  for
acceleration,  but  also  on  why  the  deceleration  that  followed  the  first  oil
shock  has been so long  and pronounced.  Governments  failed  to control
recession;  indeed,  some  were  even  instrumental  in  initiating  or  deepening
it.  Partly  in consequence,  the  confideace  that  had  sustained  investment
was replaced  by much greater  uncertainty  and pervasive  pessimism.  The
earlier  attitudes  and  the  subsequent  shift  are  well  described  by  a Swiss
economist:  "Right  or  wrong,  economists,  politicians  and  busin-'smen  were
convinced  that  demand  management  is  possible,  that  we are  able  to  avoid
slumps  and to make full  use of the growth  potential.  This  belief  was
decisive  and  produced  a climate  of  optimism.  Everyone  thought  in  terms  of
long term development  and no one was greatly  moved by short term
unpleasant  events.  This  has  changed  fundamentally  inbetween.  There  is  now
deep  pessimism  as regards  active  economic  policy,  and long  run  thinking
and  planning  has  increasingly  disappeared"  (Bombach,  1985,  p.72].
Conclusions
Important  for  any  assessment  of  future  prospects  is  the  issue  as  to
whether  past  phases  of rapid  growth  were  initiated  by some  spontaneous
development  in  the  private  economy,  or  were  sparked  off  by  shocks  to  the
system  and, in particular,  by shocks  coming  from changes  in economic
policies.  A very  summary  view  of  the  historical  experience  could  be  that:
"Most  of the  economic  growth  in the  nineteenth  century  occurred  in the
form  of  autonomous  developments,  whereas  in  the  present  century  increasing
reliance  is placed  upon patterns  of (government)  induced  development"
[Hoselitz,  1955,  p.  423].-42-
The  evidence  presented  above  supports  such  a view  only  in part.
Britain's  industrial  revolution  was  undoubtedly  a spontaneous  occurrence,
and  so  was,  probably,  the  acceleration  in  growth  recorded  in  Europe  in  the
1850s,  though  government  intervention  was already  present  at the  time,
notably  in  France  and  Prussia.  Similarly,  much  of  America's  growth  in  the
19th  century  seems  the  result  of  market  forces,  with  the  role  of  the  Civil
War,  tariffs  and  other  policies  usually  deemed  to  have  been  only  modest
(North,  1974].  But, if attention  is shifted  to the late  19th  century
acceleration  in  Western  Europe,  Russia  and  Japan,  the  role  of  exogenous
forces  seems  much  greater  - accidents  such  as gold  discoveries,  wars  and
new technologies  play  some  role;  government  intervention  in the  form  of
rising  military  expenditures,  encouragement  to investment  in  key  sectors
and  tariffs  are  at  least  equally,  or  more,  important.
The  role  of  policies  would  seem  to  have  been  even  more  crucial  after
World  War  II.  Permissive  supply  conditions  were,  of  course,  very  important
(labour,  in particular,  was  .bundant  and labour  markets  were  flexible),
but such  permissive  supply  conditions  had been  forthcoming  in earlier
periods  as well.  What  was  different  on this  occasion  were  the  conditions
favouring  the  realization  of the  potential  for  growth  [Abramovitz,  1979]
and,  in  particular,  the  new  international  and  domestic policy
arrangements.  In many ways, the years of Bretton  Woods and of the
Keynesian  consensus  represented  a "regime  change"  for  the  OECD  countries
of  a kind  not  witnessed  in  the  previous  century.  And  such  a regime  change
was bound  to alter  the  earlier  expectations  and  behaviour  of both  firms
and households  and, in particular,  their  reactions  to the new set  of
government  policies.-43-
IV.  BOTTLENECKS
The historical  survey  of Section  III  has looked  at a number  of
conditions  that  have  facilitated  high  growth  rates  in  the  past.  Some  of
these cannot  be repeated  (e.g.  the stimulating  influence  coming  from
reconstruction  after  war). Others,  however,  could  materialize  in the
future,  such  as  a return  of  more  favourable  entrepreneurial  expectations
consequent  on lower  union  power,  greater  flexibility,  etc.  Others  still,
such as  higher  levels  of demand,  could be achieved  via new policy
initiatives.  But even if more favourable  conditions  were forthcoming,
specific  problems  could  still  imperil  the return  to faster  growth.  In
particular,  a sudden  acceleration,  whether  generated  by  policy  changes  or
spontaneous  forces,  may,  in the  short  run,  encounter  some  obstacles  and
bottlenecks.  Rapid  growth,  once  set  in  motion,  may  well  be  able  to  remove
many  of these  constraints,  but  it  is  precisely  their  prior  existence  that
could  frustrate  the  achievement  of  the  required  growth  rates.
A number  of  physical  bottlenecks  have  often  been  suggested.  Most  of
these  are  usually  raised  in  the  context  of  a  policy-led  recovery,  but  some
would  also face  a more spontaneous,  supply-induced,  upsurge.  First  and
foremost,  is  the  possibility  that,  despite  high  levels  of  unemployment,  at
least in Europe,  other impediments  may make a quick  reabsorption  of
surplus  labour  very  difficult.  Alternatively,  it  is  possible  that,  because
of  low  investment  levels  for  more  than  a decade,  capacity  msy  now  (and  a
fortiori  in  the  early  1990.),  be insufficient  to  sustain  an  upward  spurt
in  demand.  Similarly,  the  supply  of some  primary  commodity  may  be  highly
inelastic.  Finally,  it  could  be held  that  even  if  no physical  shortages
were  to impede  a resumption  of  more  rapid  growth,  financial  constraints
might  have  a  similar  deterring  effect.-44-
Labour
There  has  been  an  abundant  literature  on  the  (European)  unemployment
problem  since  the  mid-1970.  which  it  is  impossible  to  survey  here  in  any
detail  [Reichlin,  19871.  Assuming,  plausibly,  that  the  phenomenon  does  not
reflect  a protracted  voluntary  shift  away  from  work  and  towards  leisure,
the  issues  that  are important  from  the  growth  point  of  view  can  best  be
discussed  under  the  following  headings:
i)  Does  growth  in  employment  require  prior  falls  in  real  wages  or  an
expansion  in  aggregate  demand  ?
ii) Would an  expansion  in aggregate  demand  risk generating  an
accelera'  n in  inflation  ?
The  debate  on  the  first  issue  has  often  been  conducted  in  terms  of
the  textbook  distinction  of "classical"  versus  "Keynesian"  unemployment.
The  classical  interpretation  would  argue  that  real  wage  resistance  to  the
twin  shocks  of the 1970.  (a  pronounced  and  long-lasting  deceleration  in
the  growth  of productivity  and  two  sharp  deteriorations  in  the  terms  of
trade)  led  not  only  to  rapid  capital-labour  substitution,  but  also  to  an
unsustainable  squeeze  on profits  and  a reduction  in  investment  such  that
the  capital  stock  is  now  insufficient  to  fully  employ  the  available  labour
force.  The  solution  to  both  the  unemployment  and  the  growth  problems  is
clearly  that  of  reducing  real  wages  (or,  better,  the  real  cost  of  labour
to  firms,  which  includes  tax  wedge  items  which  have  also  increased  rapidly
in many countries).  By restoring  profitabilityp  this  would  lead  to an
upsurge  of  investment  and hence to  both faster  growth  and lower
unemployment.
In  the  Keynesian  interpretation,  high  unemployment  is  blamed  instead
on the restrictive  fiscal  and monetary  policies  followed  by most  OECD-45-
countries  since  1974  and,  eepecially,  since  1980.  Even  when  it  is  admitted
that  profits  are too  low,  the  classical  remedy  of cutting  real  wages  is
thought  to  be  counter-productive  for  a  number  of  reasons,  First,  estimates
of  the  long-run  eLasticity  of  labour  demand  with  respect  to  the  real  wage
suggest  values  below  unity (Bean  et al., 1986;  Hamermesh,  19861  thus
raising  the  possibility  that  a fall  in  aggregate  demand  would  more  than
offset  any  favourable  effect  of  higher  profits  on  investment.  Second,  this
danger  would  be increased  if  the  improvement  in  international  competitive-
ness  achieved  thanks  to falling  real  wages  were to be pursued  by all
countries  simultaneously,  as has to some  extent  been the case  in the
recent  past  (by  the  same  token  rising  real  wages  could  hardly  have  had
much  impact  on unemployment  through  this  channel  of transmission  in the
1970s  if  all countries  were  experiencing  them  simultaneously).  Third,  a
restoration  of profits  can  be achieved  much  more easily  via a demand-
induced  stimulus  and its well known favourable  cyclical  effects  on
productivity.
The  empirical  evidence  on  what  has  caused  high  unemployment  is  mixed,
if  only  because  it  is  at  times  very  difficult  to  identify  what  forces  are
at  work.  Overall,  however,  if a  consensus  there  is,  this  would  be that
through  the late  1970s  real  wages  had indeed  risen  at an unsustainable
rate  [Sachs,  19791,  but that  in the  1980s  the  nature  of the  problem  has
changed.  Since  profitability  has  been  restored  to  levels  close  to,  or  even
above,  those  recorded  in  the  early  1970s,  and  the  growth  of  real  wages  has
decelerated,  the  continuing  rise  in  unemployment  can  only  be  explained  by
the  even  greater  tightness  of  policies  [Sachs,  1983;  Bruno,  19861.
If this is the case,  a return  to lower  unemployment,  higher
investment,  and faster  growth  could  be achieved  by a demand  boost,-46-
something  that,  in  any  case,  it  would  seem  easier  to  engineer  than  a fall
in  real  wages.  Indirect  evidence  on  the  efficacy  of  such  a strategy  can  be
gleaned  from  historical  parallels  drawn  from  the  depression  of the  1930s
[Bonnell,  1981;  Sachs,  19831.  For  four  out  of  the  five  countries  for  which
detailed  data  are  available  (Britain,  Germany,  Japan  and  Sweden,  the  fifth
being  the United  States),  real  wage  costs  grew  in the  years  1929-32,
despite  the severity  of the recession,  suggesting,  prima  facie,  that
labour  was  "pricing  itself  out  of  jobs"  (Table  6).  Yet,  the  demand  boosts
that  these  countries  received  from  1932-33  onwards,  thanks  to  depreciation
in Britain,  rearmament  in Germany,  and expansionary  fiscal  policies  in
Japan  and  Sweden,  rapidly  eliminated  the  real  wage  gap,  as nominal  wage
growth  remained  sluggish  and  productivity  was  boosted  by  recovery.  In  all
four  countries  employment  rose  and  growth  accelerated.
Historical  parallels  must  be  treated  with  caution  because  of  obvious
changes  in  circumstances.  In  particular,  it  is  possible  that  the  length  of
the  recent  recession  may  have  diminished  the  potential  cyclical  boost  to
productivity  should  firms  have  dishoarded  labour  to  a  greater  extent  than
in  earlier  downward  phases  of the  cycle  (Sachs,  1983].  Similarly,  it  may
be  more  difficult  in  present  circumstances  to  ensure  real  wage  falls  akin
to those  recorded  in the  1930s,  if  only  because  of  greater  unionization
and  stronger  real  wage  resistance.  On  the  other  hand,  "growing  out  of  the
problem"  need  not  imply  falling  real  wages,  but  only  rises  in  real  wages
below those of  productivity,  combined,  ideally,  with nominal  wage
moderation.
It  is  the  potential  difficulty  of  ensuring  the  latter  that  raises  a
different  danger  - the possibility  that,  despite  very high levels  of
unemployment,  any  demand  boost  may  raise  the  rate  of  inflation.  Available-47-
estimates  of "non-accelerating  inflation  rates  of  unemployment"  (NAIRUs)
suggest  that  these  have  drifted  upwards  in  the  1980s,  closely  mirroring
actual  rates  of  unemployment  [Reichlin,  19871.  If  such  estimates  are  to  be
believed,  a non-inflationary  recovery  may  be problematic  (unless  it  were
accompanied  by  some  form  or  other  of  incomes  policy).
While  a consensus  on  the  reasons  for  the  rise  in  European  NAIRUs  has
not  yet  ben  achieved,  much  of the  recent  literature  tends  to  stress  the
concept  of "hysteresis"  or persistence,  in other  words,  the idea  that
present  unemployment  levels  may be closely  linked  to past  unemployment
levels  [Blanchard  and  Summers,  19861.  In  its  simplest  form,  this  approach
assumes that wage bargaining  is  determined  entirely  by  so-called
"insiders",  who  set  their  claims  at  a  rate  just  sufficient  to  ensure  their
continued  employment.  "Outsiders",  i.e.  the  unemployed,  have  no effect
whatsoever  on  the  wage  bargaining  process.  If  unemployment  rises,  because
of adverse  shocks,  some insiders  lose their  status,  but the new and
smaller  group  of insiders  pursues  its  earlier  policy.  As for  companies,
these  may have little  incentive  to hire  outside  their  labour  force  at
lower  wages,  if they  can  obtain  greater  loyalty,  a better  productivity
performance,  or  a lower  incidence  of  strikes  by  granting  pay  levels  above
those  which  would  have  been  determined  by  more  atomistic  market  forces.
In  this  view,  high  unemployment  just  feeds  on  itself,  and  any  upward
shift  in its  level  is self-perpetuating.  The converse,  however,  should
also  be true,  in  which  case  the  solution  to  the  problem  would  seem  to  be
that proposed  by Solow:  "To bring  down unemployment,  just have low
unemployment  for  a while"  [Solow,  1986,  p.5331.  Indeed,  "enfranchising"
additional  workers  may actually  reduce  wage  demands  if it raises  the
number  of insiders  [Blanchard  and  Summers,  1986].  The  appropriate  policy-48-
reponse  in these  circumstances  would  seem  to  one  that  combined  demand
stimulation  and measures  designed  to raise  1.oour  mobility  so as to
increase  job  opportunities  to  outsiders  [OECD,  1987b].
While  this  may  seem  to  reinforce  the  case  for  a  demand-led  upswing,  a
note of caution  is, nonetheless,  required.  The initial  impact  of an
increase  in  demand  may  not  translate  itself  in  an  increase  in  employment,
particularly  if  labour  hoarding  is still  widespread.  While,  as  mentioned
above,  the presence  of such labour  hoarding  would  help the cyclical
recovery  in productivity  and  profits,  it  would  do little  to reduce  the
power of  insiders  and  this, in turn, could generate  inflationary
pressures.  These  would  be further  increased  if,  in  addition,  particular
skills  were  in short  supply,  as is  often  claimed  to  be the  case,  or  the
labour  market  was  riddled  with  a whole  host  of  rigidities  (low  mobility,
inflexible  wage  differentials,  job  security  provisions,  etc.).
It  is  difficult  to  know  how  far  these  fears  are  justified.  Many  of
the  rigidities  that  are  often  cited  stem  more  from  the  recession  itself
than from other causes  and may well diminish,  if not disappear,  if
recovery  occurred.  Thus,  the  much  publicized  decline  in  labour  mobility,
for  instance,  may  well  reflect,  rather  than  be  a cause  of,  declines  in  the
demand  for labour  [Flanagan,  19871.  It  also  appears  that  relative  wages
are  less  important  as  an  allocative  mechanism  than  commonly  thought,  with
job  allocation  being  primarily  sensitive  to  vacancies  rather  than  to  pay
differentials  (Reichlin,  1987J.  As for job security,  this  does raise
labour  costs  and  therefore  reduces  employment,  but  it  also  increases  the
flexibility  of internal  labour  markets  (as seen  in the  case  of Japan).
Skill  shortages  may be more  real,  at least  in some  countries,  but are
unlikely  to  have  become  more  pronounced  than  earlier.-49-
At  a  more  aggregate  level,  recent  examples  of  accelerations  in  demand
induced  by  macroeconomic  policies  (e.g.  the  1978  Bonn  Summit  experiment  in
internationally  coordinated  expansion,  the 1981-82  Mitterand  dash for
growth,  or the 1986-87  British  and  Japanese  fiscal  boosts),  may provide
some impressionistic  evidence  on the risks of re-igniting  inflation
through  standard  Keynesian  mechanisms.  The usual  verdict  on the Bonn
measures  is that their  effects  were mainly  on prices  rather  than  on
quantities,  particularly  in  the  two  majcr  expanding  economies  (Germany  and
Japan).  But this judgement  ignores  the potential  inflationary  effects
which,  during  the same  period,  were  coming  from  massive  Bundesbank  and
Bank of Japan interventions  to prop up the dollar  and, even more
importantly,  the clear  upward  shift  given  to prices  and inflationary
expectations  by  the  second  oil  shock.  Indeed,  the  acceleration  in  consumer
prices  recorded  by  both  Germany  and  Japa..  between  1978  and  1980,  gives  way
to stability  or deceleration  if attention  is shifted  to domesticall  r
generated  inflation,  as  represented  by  the  GDP  deflator  (Table  7).
The inflationary  effects  of a demand  boost  may have  been  more
apparent  in the  case  of France  in the  early  1980s.  To some  extent,  the
persistence  of high  rates  of inflation  at a time  at  which  inflation  was
decelerating  elsewhere,  may  have  been  caused  by special  measures  raising
labour  costs,  and by financial  market  expectations  of rapid price
increases  leading  to currency  depreciation  and a  vindication  of the
expectation  itself.  However,  it  has  also  been  argued  that  France's  NAIRU
was  a good  deal  higher  than  thought  so  that  demand  expansion  may  have  had
a direct  inflationary  impact  [Sachs  and  Wyplosz,  19861.  In Britain,  by
contrast,  several  years  of rapid growth  have not led to any marked
acceleration  in  wage  pressures.  It  is  true  that  fears  of  a return  to  high-50-
rates  of  inflation  have  been  expressed  in  the  course  of  1987,  in  the  wake
of more  expansionary  fiscal  policies.  So far,  however,  these  fears  have
not  materialized,  despite  falling  levels  of unemployment.  The  same  seems
to be true  of Japan,  where  the  1987  fiscal  package  appears,  so  far,  to
have  had  its  main  impact  on  quantities  rather  than  on  prices.
A very  impressionistic  conclusion  to this  discussion  would  probably
be that  neither  physical  constraints  in labour  markets  nor too  high  a
level  of  real  wages  are  at  present  very  serious  obstacles  to  the  growth  of
the OECD area.  Most of the unemployment  in Europe  would seem  to be
involuntary,  many  of  the  rigidities  that  are  claimed  to  exist  have  either
diminished  because  of recession  (e.g.  trade  union  strength),  or may  be
expected  to diminish  in intensity  if demand  recovered  (e.g.  low labour
mobility),  while  the  level  of real  wages,  even  if  too  high  in  the  later
1970s,  no longer  appears  too  high  at  present.  This  is  indirectly  supported
by the results  of an end-1985  EEC survey  on labour  market  flexibility
which showed  tha the most important  reason  preventing  an increase  in
industrial  employment  in Europe  was  lack  of  demand  (with  excessive  wage
levels  coming  only  sixth,  and insufficient  capacity  last,  among  the  ten
factors  surveyed)  [Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  19863.
The  upward  drift  in  NAIRUs,  however,  suggests  that  caution  may  have
to  be  used  if  demand  were  to  be stimulated.  Though  the  NAIRUs  themselves
could  be expected  to decline  in the wake of faster  growth,  initial
problems  on  the  wage  front  cannot  be  excluded.  To avoid  or  minimize  such
problems,  it may be necessary  to target  demand  expansion  to particular
high-unemployment  categories  of  workers  [Layard,  19861  and/or  to  introduce
forms  of  incomes  policies.-51-
Capital
An  alternative  constraint  to  expansion  could,  however,  come  from  the
capital  side  in  so  far  as  capacity  may  be insufficient  at  present.  Be  it
because  of  the  excessive  real  wage  levels  of  the  late  19709,  or  because  of
sluggish  demand  so  far  in  the  1980s,  investment  has  been  very  low  for  the
last  15  years.  Since  low  investment  appears,  in  addition,  to  have  been
accompanied  by accelerated  scrapping  consequent  upon  either  more  rapid
technological  progress  and/or  sharper  shifts  in  relative  prices  and  demand
patterns,  the  OECD  economies  may  have  been  left  with  insufficient  capacity
for  anything  but  present  sluggish  growth  rates.  For  an  individual  country
this may not be a very severe  constraint,  given the possibility  of
importing  capital  equipment  to remedy  such  shortages  (though  the  problem
would  then  manifest  itself  in  either  a  worsening  balance  of  payments  or  in
higher  inflation  via currency  depreciation).  If,  on the  other  hand,  the
expansion  was generalized  to the  whole  OECD  area,  the  external  problem
would  virtually  disappear,  but  the  inflationary  danger  would  remain.
The  evidence  on whether  capacity  is,  or is not,  available  i,i  by
necessity  imperfect.  The  existing  estimates  of  capacity  utilization  in  the
major  countries  (Table  8), suggest  that,  in mid-1987,  utilization  was
still  below  what  it  had  been  at  the  time  of  the  1979-80  peak  (let  alone  in
1973),  but well above the levels  recorded  in the trough  of 1982-83,
despite  the  weakness  of  the  intervening  recovery.
This  picture  could  be  more  worrying  should  the  slow  growth  rate  of
investment  of  recent  years  have  also  been  accompanied  by  a  deceleration  in
the growth of  technological  progress.  This may  sound surprising.
Journalistic  observations  on  the  variety  of  new  technologies  and  products,
as well  as theories  which  argue  that  recessions  eradicate  inefficiencies-52-
and create  new waves of innovating  activity  [Van  Dujin,  19831,  would
combine  in  suggesting  that  the  opposite  should  be the  case  - the  capital
stock  at present  may be small,  but it should  embody  all the latest
technologies.  Yet,  as also  argued  in Section  III  above,  a good  deal  of
empirical  evidence  suggests  exactly  the opposite  conclusion.  Process
innovations  are stimulated  by very  high  rates  of capacity  utilization;
conversely,  prolonged  slack  has strong  innovation-deterring  consequences
[Nelson,  1981].
If  both  capacity  is  in  short  supply  and  technological  progress  has
slowed  down, a  sharp and generalized  recovery  in demand  could  well
encounter  selected  bottlenecks  and  generate  upward  inflationary  pressures.
This  danger,  however,  should  not be exaggerated.  First,  the available
evidence  applies  only  to the  manufacturing  sector  of the  economy  which
accounts  for  less  than  40 (or,  in  the  United  States,  less  than  30)  per
cent  of  value  added.  Output  in  the  service  sector  can  often  be  increased
with  little  need  for  additional  capital.  Second,  overtime  and  shift-work
can  overcome  some  capacity  shortages.  Third,  the  lack  of  capacity  may  well
be  overstated  by  entrepreneurial  responses:  "One  can  be  pretty  sure  that  a
considerable  proportion  of  the  capital  stock  not  now  in  use  and  becoming
ripe  for scrapping  would  again  come into  use with an acceleration  of
demand"  [Bombach.  1985, pp.22-231.  Indirect  evidence  supporting  this
statement  comes  from  estimates  of  (gross)  ICORs  for  the  pre-  and  post-oil
shock  periods  - between  1961-73  and 1973-85,  the ICOR  of  the  OECD  area
nearly  doubled,  suggesting  the creation  of  a  good deal of  spare
capacity.  Finally,  even  if  all  these  arguments  were  to  be  discounLed,  it
should  be  remembered  that  strong  inflationary  pressures  have  usually-53-
started  in commodity  or in labour  markets,  rather  than  in the  product
markets  for  industrial  goods  (Marris,  19851.
The relative  unimportance  of capacity  shortfalls  would  seem  to
receive  some  indirect  confirmation  from  historical  experience.  Thus,  for
the  United  States:  "A scrutiny  of the 1930's  depression  does  not  reveal
any  sharp  and  prolonged  effects  on  the  rate  of  growth  of  potential  output.
While  the  level  of the  growth  path  clearly  was lowered,  after  economic
recovery  the slope  of the growth  path  was  not less  than  it  was  before"
(Nelson,  1981,  p.169].  Nor  does  evidence  from  the  reconstruction  period
that followed  on World  War II suggest  that capital  shortages  were a
significant  impediment  to  growth.  In  the  United  States,  the  conversion  of
industry  from  war-related  to  civilian  production  took  place  very  smoothly,
despite  widespread  expectations  to the contrary.  In Europe  and Japan,
bottlenecks,  especially  in energy  and transportation  were,  of course,
numerous,  yet,  they  were  overcome  surprisingly  quickly  (Armstrong  et  al.,
1984].  Finally,  in  the  1950s  and  1960s,  very  rapid  demand  expansion  hardly
ever  generated  more  than  creeping  inflation,  even  though  many  economies
were  runu1ing  as  close  to  full  capacity  utilization  levels  as  they  had  ever
been.  Investment  ratios  just  rose  as  demand  grew  and  supply  responded  with
astonishing  flexibility.
Circumstances,  of  course,  are  never  the  same  - the  1930s  may  not  be
comparable,  if  only  because  the  present  slowdown  has  been  more  protracted,
the  differences  between  the situation  in  the  late  1940s  and  now  are  too
obvious  to need stressing,  and even the 1950s  and 1960s  belong  to a
different  era,  in  view  of  the  change  in  the  climate  of  expectations.  But
one general  lesson  seems  valid.  Over the cycle,  at least,  accelerator
mechanisms  appear  to be powerful  and periods  of demand  upswing  have-54-
usually  led to increases  in investment.  Once  recovery  has started,  i1
other  words,  the  capacity  shortage  problem  may be self-correcting.  The
difficulty  may  arise  in  the  short  run  when  investment  has  not  yet  reacted
and  added  to  capacity,  while  physical  bottlenecks  are  boosting  prices.  As
argued  above,  this  danger  may be exaggerated,  the  more  so if cost-plus
pricing  is  widely  followed,  as it  seems  to  be,  in  manufacturing  industry.
To  minimize  the  inflationary  risk  it  may,  nonetheless,  be  desirabLe  to  set
speed  limits  on the  amount  of demand  stimulus  and  to  make  the  latter  as
"supply  friendly"  as  possible  (Blanchard  et  al.,  1985;  Modigliani  et  al.,
19861.
Commodities
The  three  major,  double-digit,  inflationary  episodes  of  the  last  40
years  were all triggered  off by commodity  price  explosions,  in turn
induced,  at least  on two occasions,  by very rapid  and synchronized
expansions  of demand.  Arguably,  a repetition  of such  expansions  could
generate  a  repetition  of  such price explosions,  with predictable
consequences  for  the  stance  of policies  and  the  rate  of  growth  of  output
in  the  major  consumer  countries.
This  danger  would  seem  to be least  acute  for  food  products.  At
present,  the  OECD  area  is,  if anything,  swamped  by food  surpluses.  And
even  if  reforms  in  farm  policies  in  the  EEC,  the  United  States  and  Japan
were to lead to greater  rationality  in agricultural  markets  in the
industrialized  economies,  changing  policies  (and  technological  progress)
in the developing  world seem  to have been increasingly  successful  in
turning  erstwhile  food importers  into self-sufficient  or  even net
exporting  countries.  The world,  of course,  is never safe from crop
fluctuations  for  tropical  beverages  or  from  some  major  disaster,  such  as-55-
the  concomitant  failures  of  wheat  harvests  in  the  Soviet  Union,  Australia
and  China  in  1972  [McCracken  et  al.,  1977],  but  this  would  not  seem  to  be
a sufficient  argument  for  ever  refraining  from  more  rapid  growth.
The  longer-run  price  outlook  for  industrial  raw  materials  may  not  be
that dissimilar.  To  the traditional  arguments  for "commodity  price
pessimism"  (declining  proportion  of  goods output,  substitution  with
artificial  products,  better  inventory  management,  etc. [Nurkse,  1959]),
can  be  added  the  effects  of  more  recent  technological  progress  which  has
both  accelerated  substitution  effects  (via,  for  instance,  the  development
of new  materials  such  as fine  ceramics)  and  diminished  the  raw  material
intensity  of  many  new  products.  In  the  past,  such  trends  would  have  le.:  to
a  shrinkage  of supply,  as low  prices  fed  back  onto  mine  and  plantation
closures.  Nowadays,  however,  this  effect  is somewhat  less  apparent,  at
least in the developing  world,  as countries  try to maintain  foreign
currency  earnings  at all  costs,  so  as to  service  debt  obligations.  This
is, of course,  unlikely  to be a permanent  phenomenon,  but it may be
sufficiently  lasting  for  it  not  to  endanger  a sudden  upsurge  in  activity.
The  situation  for  oil  may  well  be  different.  Unlike  markets  for  other
commodities,  the  oil  market  has  never  been  really  free  and  prices  in it
have  been  heavily  influenced  by  governments  and  cartel-like  arrangements.
As was mentioned  in Section  II above,  it is the danger  of continued
behaviour  of this  kind,  combined  with  long  lags  in  both  supply  and  demand
responses  to  changing  prices,  that  may  set  a  ceiling  to  the  growth  rate  of
the  OECD  area.  At present,  such  dangers  are heavily  discounted  and the
weakness  of oil prices  is happily  extrapolated  into  the future.  This
however,  is not a new phenomenon  - most  forecasts  of oil  prices  have
tended  to extrapolate  short-run  trends.  A recent  study,  comissioned  by-56-
the  World  Bank,  comes  to  different  conclusions  [Petroleum  Finance  Company,
19871.  It finds,  first,  that  the real  oil price  has been  surprisingly
stable  in  a long  run  (one  hundred  years)  perspective  (with  behaviour  in
1973-82  as the  only  major  exception  to this  general  rule),  and,  second,
that this same price has been subject to well defined  cyclical
fluctuations  (of  which,  again,  the  more  recent  price  changes  have  been  a
somewhat  extreme  manifestation)  (Fig.  4).  The  study  also  predicts,  on  the
basis  of a battery  of  leading  indicators,  that  the  industry's  cycle  will
turn  from  contraction  to expansion  some  time  in Ehe  firsr  half  of the
1990s,  but, unfortunately,  provides  no explicit  price forecast  (nor
projections  of the implicit  growth  of world  output  or  of the  demand  for
energy).
If,  indeed,  real  oil  prices  were  to begin  to  rise  rapidly  in the
early 1990., this  could spell danger for any  recovery in  the
industrialized  countries.  Before  accepting  such a  gloomy  conclusion,
however,  it would  seem  desirable  to test  more rigorously  the cyclical
regularity  predicted  in  this  one  study,  as  well  as  establish  more  clearly
the  extent  of  any  upward  pressure  on  prices  that  could  materialize  at  the
time,  either  exogenously  or  as  a result  of an  acceleration  in  the  growth
of  demand  in  the  OECD  area.
Financial  Constraints
Crucial  to any short  run  expansion  path,  be this  spontaneous  or
policy-induced,  is  the  rate  of  growth  of  investment.  A possible  constraint
on  an increase  in  this  rate  could  be  a shortage  of  savings.  If,  for  some
reason  or  other,  saving  propensities  in  the  OECD  economies  had  come  down,
then any attempt  at stimulus  going  beyond  the new and lower  saving
capacities  of the industrialized  countries  as a whole  would  result  in-57-
either  sharply  higher  interest  rates  or in inflation.  The  major  issue,
already  touched  upon in  Section  III  above,  is  one  of  causation.  Does  a
given,  and fairly  rigid,  level  of savings  determine  the corresponding
level  of investment,  or are savings  largely  determined  by income  and,
therefore,  investment  itself?
In  line  with  the  conclusions  reached  on long-run  trends,  it  is  the
latter  proposition  which  would  seem  to  be  more  plausible  for  the  short  run
as  well.  It is  well  known  that  investment  exhibits  fairly  marked  cyclical
fluctuations.  These are usually  well explained  by both theory  and
econometric  evidence  as  arising  from  changes  in  aggregate  demand,  interest
rates  or  other  factors  affecting  the  user  cost  of  capital.  Savings  in  the
economy  would clearly  seem to be able to adapt to  much changes.
Indirectly,  this  would  also  seem  to  be  confirmed  by  more  recent  trends  in
both  Europe  and  Japan.  Though  government  dissavings  have  declined  since
the early  1980s  and corporate  profitability  has improved,  at least  in
Europe,  investment  has  remained  very  sluggish.
The  major  exception  to  this  general  trend  is  provided  by recent  US
experience.  While  earlier  rapid  upswings  in  investment  (e.g.  between  1962
and  1965,  1970  and  1973,  or  even  19.3  and  1978),  were  wholly,  or  largely,
met by rising  domestic  savings,  in the 1982-85  recovery  the domestic
savings  ratio  did  not increase  and massive  recourse  had  to be  made to
foreign  savings.  Dollar  depreciation  and fiscal  restraint  should  both
reduce  the  need  for  external  sources  of funds  over  the  medium  term.  Yet,
the disappointing  performance  of savings  so far in the 1980s  raises the
possibility  that  the  United  States  may  now  be  suffering  from  a structural
savings  deficiency  of a  kind not seen elsewhere  among major OECD
countries.  If this were the case, an acceleration  in the growth  of-58-
investment  (necessary  to  improve  the  economy's  disappointing  productivity
record),  might  well  call  forth  renewed  capital  inflows.
It  is  difficult  to  know  whether  the  rest  of  the  OECD  area's  savings
could  cope  with  an  increase  in  investment  demand  both  at  home  and  in  the
United  States.  A very  simple  calculation  may,  however,  throw  some  light  on
the  issue.  If  one  were  to  assume  that  US gross  savings  were  to  remain  at
their  1985 ratio to GNP (16.5  per cent) but that the OECD's  fixed
investment  to  GNP  ratio  were  to  return  from  its  1985  (20.3  per  cent)  level
to  its  1973  (23.2  per  cent)  peak,  then  non-US  OECD  savings  would  have  to
increase  from  their  1985  value  of  23.3  per  cent  of  GNP  to  27.5  per  cent  -
or still  below the 28.3 per cent figure  they had reached  in 1973
(assuming,  of course,  no changes  in stockbuilding  or in the external
balance).  The  shift,  in  other  words,  might  be feasible  even  if  far  from
easy  to  achieve  - the  more  so  as  it  would  again  lead  to  a large  current
account  deficit  in  the  United  States.
So far,  many of the constraints  that  have  been  discussed  apply
equally  strongly  to any recovery  in activity,  whether  this is led  by
policy  or  stimulated  by  market  forces.  A policy-induced  upswing,  however,
that  relied  on fiscal  measures  to generate  higher  demand,  may  encounter
additional  problems  of  a crowding-out  nature  which  would  not  be  faced  by  a
spontaneous  recovery.  If  crowding-out  was  significant,  pump-priming  would
obviously  be,  at  best,  powerless  and,  at  worst,  counter-productive.
The  empirical  evidence,  on balance,  indicates  that  fiscal  policy
multipliers  are  not  as  high  as standard  Keynesian  assumptions  might  have
led  one  to  expect.  These  multipliers,  however,  are  not  negligible  either,
even  in  conditions  in  which  bond  finarcing  drives  up  interest  rates  [Chan-
Lee  and  Kato,  1984J.  If inflation  is  low,  a significant  dose  of  monetary-59-
financing  may, in any  case,  be  perfectly  appropriate.  Alternatively,  if
bond  financing  was still  preferred,  coordinated  international  expansion
should  be able to prevent  many of the unfavourable  consequences  on
activity  associated  with  exchange  rate  crowding-out.
Conclusions
The  foregoing  has  suggested  that  many  of  the  fears  about  capacity  and
other  constraints  nipping  in the  bud any recovery  in activity,  but in
particular  a policy-led  recovery,  may  well  have  been  exaggerated.  Not  all
such fears,  however,  are unfounded.  High or rising  NAIRUs,  possible
shortages  of  capacity  in  some  areas  (and  of  savings  in  the  United  States),
as  well  as the  incognita  of  the  oil  market  may  all  generate  inflationary
pressures  which  could,  in  turn,  stifle  the  recovery  process.  Two  further
issues,  not  treated  in  detail  so  far,  complicate  the  picture:  the  nature
of the time path during  the period  in which the world's  financial
imbalances  are being  slowly  resolved,  and the speed  at which  recovery
thereafter  takes  place.
The  implicit  assumption  made  in  Section  I  above  was  that  growth  for  a
number  of years  would  have  to  be slow,  as the  major  OECD  countries  re-
established  some  order  in their  public  finance  and/or  external  payments
positions.  Such a  slow grosuth  path would inevitably  have important
consequences  for  a number  of  the  constraints  discussed  in  this  section.  On
the  one  hand,  the adjustment  period  could  have  some  favourable  effects
strengthening  the  probability  of  an  autonomous  recovery.  Thus,  slow  growth
would be  likely to  further erode trade union power. Similarly,
continuation  of present  policies  of deregulation  could  increase  market
flexibility  more generally.  And the macroeconomic  policies  that are
expected  to be pursued  should  further  reduce  government  deficits  with,-60-
arguably,  favourable  effects  on private  sector  expectations.  On the other
hand, however,  continued  sluggishness  would presumably  add not only to
actual  unemployment,  but also to the NAIRU,  via the  hysteresis  mechanism
discussed  above.  Since  inv 4 stment  growth  may also turn out to be modest,
with inevitable  consequences  for  the  growth  of capacity,  the  economy  could
appear,  at the end of the  adjustment  period,  even  more supply-constrained
than  it is  now.
This, in turn,  suggests  that any  expansion  from  then onwards  should
be only  moderate.  A sudden  sharp  acceleration  in  growth  rates  could  create
temporary excess  demand problems in  labour, product, commodity and
possibly  even in capital  markets,  with serious  risks  for inflation.  Yet,
too slow a pick up may not put in motion  the indispensable  accelerator
mechanism  for investment,  may not generate  the higher  tax revenues  that
would seem necessary  to moderate  budget  deficits  (on the  assumption  that
fiscal  policy had played a leading role in the expansion),  and, most
importantly  of all,.may  not c.eate  an upsurge  of confidence  which would
seem to be the sine qua non condition  for a more permanent  return to
higher  growth  rates.  The compromise  solution  to this speed  limit  problem
is, of course, the one of engineering  a recovery  which is neither too
rapid  for inflation  to accelerate,  nor  too slow  for  growth  to  falter,  with
policies,  in addition,  geared  as much as possible  to the supply  side.  The
enunciation  of this list of requirements  is sufficient  to show the great
difficulties  of successfully  following  such  a strategy.
Ultimately,  however,  it may be better  to err  on the  side  of rashness
rather  than  of caution.  Unless  there  are  shocks  to expectations,  there  may
be a tendency  for things  to continue  unchanged.  Any rate of growth,  if
established  for some time, may be difficult to alter, and may  indeed-61-
appear  as supply  constrained.  The  depression  of the  1930.  may  well  be  a
case  in  point,  as illustrated  by the  following  quotation  by  an  economist
hardly  partial  to simple  Keynesian  messages:  "Experience  showed  that  as
soon  as deflation  was stopped,  the  huge  structural  distortions  that  had
been  diagnosed  by  theorists  during  the  depression  shriveled  as  quickly  as
they  had  surfaced  earlier.  Monetary  contraction  ...  proved  to  be a much
more important  cause  of high  unemployment  than  structural  distortions"
(Haberler,  1986,  pp.69-701.-62-
V.  ISSUES  FOR  THE  FUTURE
The issue of what determines  longer-term  accelerations  and
decelerations  in the  economic  growth  of the  industrialized  countries  is
controversial.  This  paper  has  argued  that  crucial  for  high  growth  phases
are optimistic  business  expectations,  seen  as a major  driving  force  of
capital  accumulation.  Both  theory  and past  evidence  suggest  that such
expectations  c6n  be encouraged  or sustained  either  by endogenous  market
forces,  or by what have been called  exogenous  "system  shocks'.  Any
appraisal  of future  growth  prospects  should  thus  trw  to assess  whether
new,  favourable,  shocks  are  likely  to  occur,  or  whether  the  mere  absence
of negative  shocks,  combined  with the restoration  of a more market-
oriented  economic  system,  could  generate  a  spontaneous  upswing.
The  historical  experience  suggests  that  a number  of conditions  are
probably  necessary  for  an  autonomous,  investment-led,  growth  acceleration
to take  place:  the  reappearance  of a "reserve  army  of the  unemployed",
together  with  low  and  stable  inflation  and  inflationary  expectations;  the
accumulation  of a backlog  of  unexploited  innovations  made  possible  by a
continuous  progress  in  knowledge;  the  scrapping  of  significant  segments  of
the  capital  stock,  generating  potential  demand  for new investment;  the
elimination  of institutional  and other  rigidities  to the free  play  of
market  forces;  the emergence  of Schumpeterian  entrepreneurs  ready  to
venture  into risky  projects  by seizing  the opportunities  provided  by
deregulated  markets,  on-going  technical  progress,  scarce  capital  and
abundant  labour.
The  simultaneous  fulfillment  of  all  these  conditions  is  clearly  no
easy  matter.  Thus,  it  may  come  as  no surprise  to  find  that  the  last  phase-63-
of  rapid  growth  that  may  have  fitted  this  so-called  spontaneous  model  goes
back  to the  middle  of  the 19th  century.  It is  possible,  however;  that
circumstances  in the late 1980s  and early 19909  may conform  to these
conditions  to  a  much  greater  extent  than  for  a long  time.  Unemployment  is
likely  to  remain  high  in  the  foreseable  future  and,  barring  supply  shocks
or irresponsible  policies,  inflation  should  stay low; technology  is
clearly  advancing;  investment  will have been relatively  depressed  for
nearly two decades,  and the present  policies  tending  to  increase
flezibility  should  bear  some  fruit.  More  problematic,  however,  may  be  the
appearance  of  Schumpeterian  entrepreneurs.  Indeed,  Schumpeter  himself  (and
Galbraith  with him), would have argued that in today's  world of
oligopolies  and  conglomerates  they  probably  no longer  exist.  Yet,  their
re-emergence  cannot be  excluded.  As  argued in Section  II  above,
technological  innovations  on  the  one  hand  (in  particular  the  micro  chip),
more  diversified  demand  patterns  on the  other,  are  combining  in  making
possible  a  revival  of  smaller-scale  production.  Small need not be
beautiful,  but  it  could  be  both  feasible  and  inexpensive.  In  the  process,
it  could  also  generate  faster  growth.
Optimism  is  tempered,  however,  by  she  realization  that  many  of  these
conditions  have  been  present  and  have  been  strengthened  for  some  time,  yet
growth  in the industrialized  countries  has, if anything,  decelerated
further.  The only major exception  to this general  rule may be the
experience  of the  United  Kingdom  which  has  been  at the  vanguard  in  the
movement  to  reverse  many  of  the  institutional  features  of  the  earlier  era
and  which,  in the last  few  years,  has  witnessed  both  steady  and  rapid
growth.  Britain's  favourable  performance,  however,  reflects  also  recovery
from  a very  deep recession,  real  exchange  rate  depreciation,  oil self--64-
sufficiency  and a clear fiscal  boost, factors  which may well have been
more important  than  the  effects  of  Thatcherisii.
Hope for an eventual  acceleratiori  in the  OECD area as a whole,  may
thus  have to be put in the alternative  view of some  external  disturbance
recreating  more buoyant  expectations.  Arguably,  the  "Thatcher  revolution"
is precisely  a  shock of this kind, but, quite apart from the unproven
verdict,  it is not  one  that  has  been  administered  in  many  other  countries.
A favourable  external  disturbance  that  affected  most of the  OECD area  was
the reverse oil shock of 1986, which many hoped  would usher in faster
growth.  Yet, despite a  strong boost to profits and a marked downward
effect  on prices,  confidence  did  not surge,  in part,  no doubt,  because  of
continuing  tight  policies.
One  possible favourable  shock could arise in the future from
political  and economic  developments  in Eastern  Europe.  A combination  of
multilateral  disarmament  and sweeping  economic  reforms,  initiated  by a
much more  dynamic Russian leadership,  could generate a  new  wave of
optimism  in the  West,  and particularly  in Europe,  in the  expectation  of a
major surge  in demand  from the East.  It would  be ironic,  by the  way, if,
following  the "rescue"  of capitalism  by socialism  in the  late 1940s,  when
Stalin's  choice of the cold war prompted  the adoption  of the Marshall
Plan,  capitalism  was agaiii  helped  at a time  of difficulty  by the  socialist
countries.  Yet, such an outcome  does not seem very likely.  Disarmament
should  have beneficial  effects  on the US budget  deficit,  but its wider
economic implications,  unfortunately,  need not all  be  favourable to
growth. As  for  new markets, earlier experience justifies a  certain
scepticism.  The gains from colonial  expansion  in the late 19th century
have often  been exaggerated.  Closer  to the present,  the growth  in demand-65-
from the centrally  planned  economies  in the 1960s  and 1970s  quickly  found
its  limits  as these  countries  developed  large  trade  deficits.
More realistic  may be reliance  on changes  in government  policies
which on past occasions  (e.g.  the late 19th century  or the period  after
World War II), may well have been instrumental  in generating  longer-run
upswings.  There  are difficulties  in this area too,  however.  One possible
scenario could  envisage an  inflationary solution to  the  financial
disequilibria  of the 1980s,  ushering  in a new policy  cycle  of relatively
easy  money in the 1990s.  It is  doubtful,  however,  whether  such  a strategy
could  be successful  in a world whose  memory  of high inflation  was still
very  recert.
The  alternative  of adopting  Keynesian-inspired,  pump-priming  policies
may well encounter  speed limits.  As argued in Section IV above,  either
expansion  is too slow and unable  to overcome  the sluggishness  of private
sector  expectations,  or it is too rapid  and generates  mainly  inflation.
Boldness  rather  than caution  may be a preferable  policy  if it is held,
plausibly,  that supply  conditions  tend to adapt to demand changes  with
surprising  flexibility,  but boldness  may encounter  a  subtler and more
pervasive  obstacle  than a rigid supply  potential  - scepticism  about  the
efficacy  of  policies  themselves.
While the 1950.  and 1960s  were almost certainly  an era in which
companies  and households  implicitly  accepted  a Keynesian  model of the
economy,  perceptions  have  changed  very  fundamentally  in the  1980s.  Rightly
or  wrongly, economic agents are  increasingly  convinced of  the  near
impotence  of government  policies  in affecting  real variables,  be this
because of  the  belief  in  models  of  market clearing and  rational
expectations  or because  of the reaiization  that,  in  an integrated  world,-66-
independent  policy-making  is  no  longer  feasible.  This  may  well  condemn  an7
reflationary  attempt  from the start since,  if it is surrounded  by
scepticism,  it will be  unable,  almost  by definition,  to galvanize
entrepreneurial  expectations  (the  French  experience  of  the  early  1980.  may
be  a  case  in  point).
One  possible  solution  to this  difficulty  could  come  from  a "system
shock"  that  altered  this  feeling  and re-established  macroeconomic  policy
as an effective  tool of government  action.  In so far as present  and
foreseable  scepticism  arises from the correct  perception  that our
economies  have become  very interdependent,  the solution  could  be the
transfer  of  responsibility  for  aggregate  demand  policies  from  the  national
to the supranational  sphere  via  a much  greater  degree  of international
policy  coordination.  This  would  be insufficient  to allay  the fears  of
those  who start  with the assumption  that  any government  macroeconomic
policy  must  be  impotent,  but  such  beliefs,  if  they  are  held  at  all  outside
academia,  are  more  prevalent  in  financial  than  in  "real"  markets.
It  is  true  that  even  international  coordination  of  policies  may  not
be  a panacea.  Indeed,  pioneering  work  on  its  possible  impact  has  suggested
that  its  effects  may  be relatively  small  (Oudiz  and Sachs,  1984].  Such
work,  however,  almost  certainly  underestimates  the  potential  benefits  of
cooperation  if  only  because  the  multipliers  which  it  uses  (and  which  ar-
obtained  from existing  econometric  models)  might not be sta;3e  if
international  policy  cooperation  were  to  be  adopted.  In  other  words,  the
move  towards  coordinated  policies  may be akin  to one  of those  very  few
regime  changes  that ju.,tify  the "Lucas  critique"  of econometric  model
blilding  (Sims,  1982).  Just  as the  adoption  of  demand  management  at the
national  level  may have  fe!-ourably  altered  the response  of the  private-67-
sector  to government  policies  in the 1950s  and 1960s,  a shift  to more
cooperative  international  demand  management  policies  may have  a similar
effect  in  future.
A more  coordinated  approach  to  policy  would  presumably  also  tackle
the issue  of the international  monetary  system.  The last two  eras  of
relatively  rapid  growth  (at  the  turn  of  the  last  century  and  in  the  1950s
and  1960s),  were  both  periods  in  which  exchange  rates  were  fixed,  thanks
in large  measure  to the  presence  of a hegemonic  power.  Conversely,  both
the interwar  years  and the  more recent  period,  saw the  appearance  of
several  key  currencies  and  moves  to  floating  regimes.  Arguably,  stability
of exchange  rates strongly  diminishes  business  uncertainty  and thus
contributes  to  a favourable  performance.  While  cooperation  would  be  unable
to  ensure  the  return  of  a  hegemonic  power,  it  could,  at  least,  attempt  to
instill  much  greater  stickiness  in  the  process  of  exchange  rate
determination.
The policy  recommendations  that stem from the preceding  are
relatively  straightforward.  If hope is to be placed  in a spontaneous
recovery,  then  the  present  emphasis  on the  removal  of  rigidities  and  the
restoration  of flexibility  is clearly  to be welcomed.  The historical
evidence  suggests  that  spontaneous  upswings  have  not  been  very  frequent,
but  it  does  not  rule  out  their  possibility.  To  maximize  their  chance  of
occurring,  it  would  seem  that  policies  designed  to  encourage  the  formation
and  growth  of small  firms  are  highly  desirable,  as  are  policies  that  do
not reduce  the  level  of aggregate  demand.  If,  alternatively,  it  is felt
that  a pure  market  response  is too slow  and uncertain  a mechanism  for
faster  growth,  then  the  policy  recommendation  is  for  an  increase,  and,-68-
ideally,  a sudden  and  sharp  increase,  in  the  degree  of  policy  coordination
at  the  international  level.
The latter,  unfortunately,  does  not  seem  very  likely,  at least  in
present  circumstances.  If  anything,  the  world  appears  to  be  moving  in  the
direction  of a  fragmentation  into several  major trading  and currency
blocks,  and this  movement  may  be reinforced  by the  financial  imbalances
and the slow  growth  that  can  be expected  to prevail  over  the short  to
medium  run.  As for  the  policies  designed  to  remove  rigidities,  these  have
so  far  taken  more  the  form  of  indiscriminate  deflation  than  of  structural
reform,  hardly  a path  likely  to encourage  entrepreneurial  expectations.
Given  the continuing  emphasis  placed  in so many countries  on the  pre-
Keynesian  objective  of a balanced  budget,  this  bias  seems  unlikely  to
change  in the foreseable  future.  On either  count,  the prospects  for
longer-run  growth  look  hardly  buoyant.-69-
Table  1.  Weight  of various  areas  in  world  GDP  and  importsa
Actual  Hypothetical
1965  1965-1985  1985  1985-2000  2000  b
weightsb  growth  weights  growth  weights
(Z)  (Z)  (Z)  (X)  (M)
GDP
Industrialized  countries  84.0  3.3  78.1  2.0  66.7
Developing  countries  16.0  5.3  21.9  6.0  33.3
Upper  middle-incomeC  7.9  5.4  11.0  ..  es
Lower  middle-income  3.8  5.1  5.0  ..  ..
Low-income  4.2  5.4  509  so  ..
Hemosandum  items:
NICS'  2.6  6.8  4.7  8.0  9.5
Asia-Pacific  regione  12.8  6.0  19.9  5.0  26.3
(including  North  America)f(18.5)  (5.4)  (25.8)  so  so
Imports
Industrialized  countries  68.0  6.0  71.6  3.0  62.1
Developing  countries  32.0  5.1  28.4  6.0  37.9
Upper  middle-incomec  (17.4)  5.8  17.7  ..  g
Lower  middle-income  (8.0)  4.1  5.9  ..  ..
Low-income  (7.2)  3.6  4.8  ..  ..
Memosandum  items:
NICs,  4.5  7.9  6.7  10.0  15.6
Asia-Pacific  regione  13.6  7.6  19.3  7.0  29.6
______________________________________________________________________________
a. Excluding  World  Bank  non-member  countries.
b.  At 1985  prices.
c. Including  high-income  oil  exporters.
d. Brazil,  Hong-Kong,  Mexico,  Singapore  and South  Korea.
e.  ASEAN  countries,  Australia,  China,  Hong-Kong,  Japan,  New  Zealand  and  South
Korea.
f.  Same  countries  as above,  plus  tentative  estimates  for  the  GNP of the  US
Pacific  Region  and  of British  Columbia,  based  on personal  income  data  for
these  areas.
Sources:  World  Bank,  1987,  and  author's  estimates.-70-
Table  2. Scenarios  to 1992
…__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _…_  _  _______________
"Reference"  gcenarios
scenarioa  No.1  No.2c
Average  annual  percentage  changes
CNP  - OECD  area  2.5  2.1  2.1
- United  States  2.4  1.6  -2.1
- Japan  2.8  2.5  2.4
- Germany  2.4  2.2  2.0
Employment  - OECD area  0.8  0.6  0.7
Consumption  deflator  - OECD  area  2.9  2.7  2.9
Levels  in 1992
Current  account  ($  bn.)  - United  States  -168  -118  -108
to  of  to  - Japan  102  88  92
of  to  to  - Germany  24  16  14
General  govt.  net lending  (ZGNP)  - U.S.  -0.6  1.1  1.1
Interest  rates  (short-term)  - U.S.  3.2  3.2  4.1
a.  Eztrapolation  of  present  policy  "intents";  ezchange  rates  stable  at
November  1986  levels.
b. Reductions  in  US government  expenditure  and  increases  in  US income  tax  of
$ 70 bn.  and  $  50  bn.  respectively  by 1992.
c. Same  US fiscal  policy  as in  Scenario  1  and  further  dollar  depreciation  by
15  per  cent  in 1988.
Source:  Model-based  simulations  done  on the  responsibility  of the  World  Bank.-71-
Table  3.  Growth  of  total  output
average  annual  percentage  changes
Total  Western  North
OECD  Europe  America
1870-1913  2.7  1.9  4.1
1870-1892  2.4  1.6  4.6
1892-1913  2.8  2.3  3.7
1913-1952  2.3  1.4  3.1
1913-1922  0.3  -0.1  1.8
1922-1937  2.3  2.5  2.1
1937-1946  3.1  -2.1  5.0
1946-1952  4.5  6.7  3.9
1952-1985  3.3  3.7  3.3
1952-1973  4.6  4.8  3.7
1973-1985  2.5  1.9  2.6
Sources:  Naddison,  1982;  OECD,  1987a.-72-
Table  4. Growth  of total  output  in selected  countries,  1830-1913
average  annual  percentage  changes
______________________________________________________________________________
1830s  and  1850s  and  1870s  and  1890s  to
1840s  1860s  1880s  1913
France  1.6  1.9  0.9  1.9
Germany  1.8  2.6  2.0  3.2
Italy  ..  1.0  0.5  2.8
United  Kingdom  2.0  2.4  1.9  1.7
United  States  ..  4.2  4.6  3.6
Note:  Exact  periods  for  each country  are:  France,  1832-52,  1852-69,  1869-96,
1896-1913;  Germany,  1831-57,  1857-74,  1874-93,  1893-1913;  Italy,  1861-
75,  1875-96,  1896-1913;  United  Kingdom,  1831-51,  1851-71,  1871-96,  1896-
1913;  United  States,  1850-73,  1873-92,  1892-1913.
Source:  Maddison,  1982.-73-
Table  5.  The  technology  gap
ratio  of  GDP  per  man-hour  to  United  States  level
Europe  Japan
1900  68
1913  61  22
1929  56  26
1938  61  33
1950  43  14
1979  78  53
Source:  Haddison,  1982.-74-
Table  6. Real  wages,  productivity  and  output  in  the  Great  Depression
average  annual  percentage  changes
Real  wagesa  Productivitya  outputb
1929-32  1932-37  1929-32  1932-37  1929-32  1932-37
Germany  8.9  -4.9  -2.9  3.6  -5.6  8.5
JapanC  5.5  -5.0  1.8  3.2  2.0  7.8
Sweden  1.2  0.4  -2.6  4.9  -1.4  4.4
United  Kingdom  3.5  -1.2  -1.4  1.5  -1.7  4.3
United  States  -3.6  4.5  -7.6  4.0  -10.4  6.5
a. In the  corporate  sector.
b.  Total  GDP.
c.  Manufacturing  sector  only.
Sources:  Ohkawa  and Shinohara,  1979;  Donnell,  1981;  Maddison,  1982.-75-
Table  7. Selected  macroeconomic  indicators,  1977-82
Germany  and  Japan
percentage  changes  from  previous  year
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982
Cermany
GDP  growth  3.0  2.9  4.2  1.4  0.2  -0.6
Budget  balancea  -2.4  -2.4  -2.6  -2.9  -3.7  -3.3
Consumer  prices  3.7  2.7  4.1  5.4  6.3  5.3
GDP  deflator  3.6  4.2  4.0  4.5  4.2  4.8
Effective  exchange  rate  7.9  6.3  6.1  1.0  -7.3  4.1
Honey  supply  (M1)  8.1  13.5  7.2  2.4  0.9  3.2
Japan
CDP  growth  5.3  5.1  5.2  4.4  3.9  2.8
Budget  balancea  -3.9  -5.9  -4.3  -3.9  -4.4  -3.5
Consumer  prices  8.0  3.8  3.6  8.0  4.9  2.6
CDP  deflator  5.7  4.6  2.6  2.8  2.7  1.7
Effective  exchange  rate  10.6  23.1  -7.2  -3.8  13.1  -5.7
Money  supply(MU)  7.0  10.8  9.9  0.8  3.7  7.1
a. In  percentage  of current  price  GDP.
Sources:  OECD,  Historical  Statistics,  1960-1984;  IMF,  International
Financial  Statistics  - Yearbook.-76-
Table  8. Capacity  utilizaticn  rates  in  manufacturing,  1973-87
percentages
1973  1979-80  1982-83  early
peak  peak  trough  1987
-----------------------------------------
United  States  87.7  87.2  69.0  80.1
Japana  100.0  96.6  85.6  88.2
France  87.8  85.3  77.0  83.1
Germany  88.1  86.0  74.3  84.0
Italy  78.8  77.3  69.1  76.9
United  Kingdom  90.6  87.6  73.0  87.4
Totalb  89.6  88.0  73.4  82.5
a. Indices,  1973=100.
b. Using  1982  GDP  weights.
Sources:  EEC,  European  Economy,  Supplement  B;  OECD,  Monthly  Economic
Indicators;  Statistics  Bureau,  Management  and  Co-ordination  Agency,
Monthly  Statistics  of  Japan;  UNCTAD,  Trade  and Development  Report,
1987.- 77  -
Fig.1  Level  of  OECD  GDP,  1870-1985
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Fig.4  Oil  Prices  and  the  Petroleum  Cycle
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